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It is now widely accepted that the objective of corporate law and 
corporate governance should be to promote the wealth and welfare 
of shareholders.  Business managers typically profess that they see 
themselves as primarily accountable to shareholders, as opposed to 
being subject to a responsibility to a wider range of interests, 
including those of employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, and 
local communities.1  Scholars of corporate law, financial economists, 
and judges tend to share this view.2  Shareholder primacy, however, 
has not always enjoyed such widespread approval.  It is true that since 
the time of the famous Berle-Dodd debate,3 the discussion has always 
had two sides: some argue for greater accountability on the part of 
managers to shareholders, while others favor a larger responsibility of 
managers to other “stakeholders” of the corporation and even a 
corporate social responsibility to society as a whole. 
Large, publicly traded corporations in the middle of the 
twentieth century were characterized by managerial capitalism—
managers had taken over as the bearers of the creative 
entrepreneurial spirit within the firm and, compared to their 
predecessors a generation or two earlier, they were hardly responsible 
to owners.4  Economists sometimes saw this as a beneficial advance 
over the previous period of economic development characterized by 
a focus on founders and founding families, given that the system 
seemed more rational and stable.5  Around 1980, however, 
 
 1  See Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning 
Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. LAW. 1435, 1445 (2005) (“[U]ntil quite recently, 
the idea that directors might show concern for stakeholders has been associated 
mostly with sandals-wearing activists . . . .”). 
 2  E.g., Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its 
Implementation Under Corporate Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2198459 (discussing shareholder wealth maximization as 
the objective of corporate law); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea 
that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (2012). 
 3  A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 
(1931) (arguing that managers should be accountable to shareholders); Merrick 
Dodd, Jr., For whom Are Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1147–48 (1932) 
(arguing that managers should have a wider responsibility to society); A. A. Berle, Jr., 
For whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1366–67 
(1932) (rebutting the theory asserted by Dodd, supra). 
 4  See infra Part II. 
 5  Infra notes 24–31 and accompanying text. 
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managerial capitalism began to give way to investor capitalism.6  
Hostile takeovers and, later, equity-based executive compensation, 
began to emerge as the new forces creating incentives for managers 
to focus on share value.7 
This Article explores the reasons for this highly consequential 
change.  It is often thought that shareholder primacy prevailed 
because it is more efficient, and managerialism therefore could no 
longer be maintained under modern economic circumstances.8  
Relatedly, shareholder primacy is usually explored only as a 
phenomenon on the demand side of the capital market, that is, of 
the corporate governance of firms.  By contrast, this Article argues 
that one of the most important reasons for the shift is a fundamental 
change in the supply side of the capital market, which has led to the 
heightened importance of interests of financial investors.  
Specifically, this Article suggests that changes in the pension system 
helped to transform corporate governance into a system dominated 
by the shareholder interest, to the detriment of the managerial 
model.  Until the 1970s, workers typically relied on payouts from a 
defined benefit (DB) plan for retirement.  Employers bore the 
investment risk, and designed plans to create incentives to stay with a 
particular employer.9  Workers’ human capital and pension wealth 
were tied to the employer, thus creating a strong dependence on the 
employer’s continued ability to fund the plan.  Since the 1970s, 
however, DB plans have been losing ground to defined contribution 
(DC) plans, including 401(k) plans.10  These plans have the 
advantage of being more portable in the case of a job change, but 
workers bear the investment risk.  Hence, a large part of the 
populace, at least the politically relevant middle class, became 
dependent on capital markets for retirement savings, and thus 
became, in the words of Chancellor Strine in the Delaware Court of 
Chancery, “forced capitalists.”11 
 
 6  E.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439, 444 (2001). 
 7  See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and 
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 884 (2002) 
(suggesting that executive compensation creates incentives to abandon takeover 
defenses once the offer price has been bid up). 
 8  E.g. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 444. 
 9  See infra Part III.A. 
 10  Infra Part III.A. 
 11  Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground?  Reflections on the 
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 
33 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007). 
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These changes in the pension system had consequences on the 
structure of the U.S. economy and the importance, nature, and 
content of corporate law that are hard to overestimate.  First, pension 
wealth is no longer tied to the firm, but instead to the capital market.  
Second, workers’ incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital 
seem to have decreased.  In combination, these two shifts have not 
only been tied to higher labor mobility, but also to an increasing 
importance of pro-shareholder policies to the middle class relative to 
pro-labor policies aimed at strengthening employees’ positions with a 
particular employer.12  Thus, the appeal of shareholder primacy and 
enhanced shareholder rights increased.  Ultimately, this is likely the 
reason why shareholder power has such widespread support today, 
and shareholders are slowly but steadily gaining power at the expense 
of boards of directors. 
A number of reasons for the rise of shareholder primacy have 
previously been advanced.  It is sometimes thought that 
developments in economics and finance, specifically agency theory,13 
contributed to an understanding that shareholder primacy was more 
efficient than managerial capitalism and delegitimized managers’ 
technocratic expertise.14  But the relative success of the labor-centric 
corporate governance systems of West Germany and Japan in the 
1980s rekindled U.S. academics’ interest in foreign corporate law and 
created doubts about the superiority of U.S. practices.15  Relatedly, it 
is often thought that shareholder primacy is inherently more 
efficient, as shown, for example, by the failure of the conglomerate 
 
 12  Infra Part IV. 
 13  See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) 
(establishing agency theory). 
 14  See PIERRE-YVES GOMEZ & HARRY KORINE, ENTREPRENEURS AND DEMOCRACY: A 
POLITICAL THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 146–47 (R. Edward Freeman et al. 
eds., 2008) (discussing managerial expertise being increasingly questioned due to 
more widespread business knowledge); RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO 
HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 313–17 (3rd ed., 2010) 
(discussing how agency theory undermined the legitimacy of the managerial model); 
Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
1121, 1127–30 (2011) (discussing the rise of the shareholder primacy model); 
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 449 (citing the “force of logic” as a reason 
for the dominance of the shareholder model); Roberta Romano, After the Revolution 
in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 343–46 (2005) (discussing the impact of 
corporate finance on corporate law and scholarship). 
 15  E.g., Mark J. Roe, German “Populism” and the Large Public Corporation, 14 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 187 (1994). 
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movement in the 1970s.16  In this view, shareholder-oriented firms are 
inherently more competitive, which is why they eventually began to 
dominate markets.17  It has therefore been suggested that the absence 
of strong shareholder primacy in the post-World War II decades was 
only possible because the U.S. economy was growing and not subject 
to intense competition.18 
This Article argues that the social desirability of shareholder 
primacy is contingent on specific conditions: pensions must directly 
depend on investment success in the capital market, rather than on a 
specific employer’s or government’s ability and willingness to keep 
paying them.  While this is, at its core, an argument of economic 
efficiency, this Article also explores changes to the politics of 
corporate governance.  Though it is clear that a number of factors 
affected actual corporate governance reforms through political and 
economic channels, this Article argues that the rise of shareholder 
primacy was in part an unintended consequence of regulatory 
changes in the pension sector.  This Article’s argument complements 
other explanations that have focused on the growth of the financial 
industry and the availability of external debt financing, particularly 
for takeovers.19 
Most shareholder primacists would typically argue that the U.S. 
corporate governance system does not perfectly implement 
 
 16  See KHURANA, supra note 14, at 297–305 (discussing economic distress in the 
1970s as a reason for the shift in business culture); Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate 
Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown?  The Case of the S&P 500, 65 
BUS. LAW. 1, 6–7 (2009) (discussing the inefficiency of conglomerates and mergers 
that destroyed shareholder value). 
 17  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 449–52 (arguing for the superiority 
of the shareholder model). 
 18  E.g., William T. Allen, Engaging Corporate Boards: The Limits of Liability Rules in 
Modern Corporate Governance, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, 
AND FINANCE CAPITALISM 82, 90–91 (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 
2011); GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 14, at 137 (explaining that the prosperity of the 
post-war decades led to stability in corporate governance arrangements); see also 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
1519, 1524–33 (1997) (suggesting that liberalized trade regimes and capital markets 
have shifted income away from labor); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth 
Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2066–68 (2001) 
(suggesting that shareholder primacy is more efficient in competitive markets). 
 19  E.g., GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED 
AMERICA 81–85 (2009) (discussing the role of takeovers in ending managerialism); 
John W. Cioffi, Fiduciaries, Federalization, and Finance Capitalism: Berle’s Ambiguous 
Legacy and the Collapse of Countervailing Power, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1081, 1106–08 
(2011) (discussing takeovers and the rising power of the financial industry in the 
1980s); Sanford M. Jacoby, Labor and Finance in the United States, in THE EMBEDDED 
FIRM, supra note 18, at 277, 279–89. 
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shareholder primacy,20 and often it is not clear if specific reforms 
actually help shareholders.21  While the politics of corporate 
governance are complicated, like political scientists such as Peter 
Gourevitch and James Shinn, this Article suggests that these reforms 
led to a stronger preference of pro-shareholder policies among 
workers.22  Since pro-investor corporate law has become more 
important for the middle class, pro-shareholder policies have typically 
had the support of the center-left and of unions during the past two 
decades, which would previously have been hard to conceive.  
Admittedly, the strongest advocates of shareholder activism have in 
fact often been institutions managing DB plans, such as unions and 
state public pension systems, who became active equity investors 
because of the elimination of regulatory restrictions on their 
portfolios.  These regulatory changes were clearly another factor that 
contributed to the spread of the idea of shareholder primacy.  Both 
developments are two elements of a common trend toward equity 
investment.  The increased dependence of retirees on equity 
investment strengthened the role of institutional investors across the 
board and made pro-shareholder policies more attractive.  Drawing 
from the labor economics literature, this Article points out how firms 
 
 20  E.g. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 833 (2005) (arguing, from a shareholder primacy perspective, that 
shareholder power should be increased). 
 21  E.g. Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA 
L. REV. 561, 590 (2006) (arguing that increased shareholder power would be 
detrimental to shareholder interests). The SEC’s long-discussed proxy access rule 
provides a pertinent example. The SEC has repeatedly issued proposals to amend its 
rules in order to expand “shareholder access,” which would have permitted larger 
shareholders to place nominees for a limited number of seats on the company’s 
proxy statement.  The initial proposal was made in 2003.  Security Holder Director 
Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784, 60,785 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003).  Section 971 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act explicitly gave the SEC authority to pass such a rule, which it did 
in the form of Rule 14a-11.  This highly controversial rule was struck down by the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  Bus. Roundtable v. S.E.C., 647 F.3d 
1144 (DC Cir. 2011).  The SEC subsequently decided not to appeal.  See Press 
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement by SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro 
on Proxy Access Litigation (Sept. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-179.htm.  Regarding the discussion,  
see, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Insignificance of Proxy Access, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 137 (2011); Jill E. Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY 
L. J. 435 (2012) (both doubting the purported beneficial effects of the rule). 
 22  PETER ALEXIS GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE 
CONTROL 220–21 (2005) (suggesting a shift in the political preferences of workers 
toward minority shareholder protection); see also ALAN DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, 
THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 66–70 (2009) (discussing retirement 
savings of workers as reason for the political importance of shareholders); Davis, 
supra note 14, at 1129. 
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used the possibility created by these changes to shift how they interact 
with workers, and how this shift affected the creation of human 
capital.  If firms have indeed become more competitive, it is likely 
due in part to these changes. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides a brief overview 
of the move from “managerial” to “shareholder” capitalism that has 
so fundamentally transformed the practice and theory of corporate 
law, and discusses reasons that have been advanced in the literature.  
Part III describes the move from DB to DC plans in retirement 
savings and explores the reasons for the shift, which are grounded 
primarily in regulatory changes, but are also connected to structural 
changes in the U.S. economy.  Part IV connects the two issues and 
suggests that there is an institutional complementarity between the 
pension and corporate governance systems: when many people 
effectively depend on capital markets for retirement savings, 
shareholder primacy in corporate law is relatively more desirable 
from the perspective of workers.  Concurrently, with increased labor 
mobility and possibly less firm-specific human capital, the significance 
of policies protecting workers’ positions with a particular employer 
has decreased.  While Part IV takes a public policy perspective, Part V 
illustrates the effects for the political economy of corporate 
governance.  Shareholder primacy has become a political cause for 
“the man on the street,” and therefore the center-left.  Unions 
adapted their strategies to this new situation and joined the ranks of 
shareholder activists pushing for stronger shareholder rights and 
shareholder wealth maximization.  Part VI suggests that an 
international comparison with other developed economies confirms 
the thesis: continental Europe and Japan, whose corporate 
governance systems are known to be more mindful of the interests of 
employees and less shareholder-oriented than that of the United 
States, also have very different pension systems, in which workers do 
not depend on the capital markets for retirement.  Part VII 
concludes. 
II. FROM MANAGERIAL TO SHAREHOLDER CAPITALISM 
The American corporate landscape today is very different from 
what it was thirty years ago.  At least from the 1930s to the 1970s, 
corporate governance was characterized by what is often called 
“managerial capitalism.”  Large corporations were dominated by 
extensive managerial hierarchies that were, to some extent, self-
replicating.  Often corporate boards effectively perpetuated 
themselves without giving strong weight to the interests of 
GELTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2013  1:25 PM 
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shareholders.23  Corporations were truly “Berle-Means” firms, in the 
vein of the seminal study by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means, 
which identified the “separation of ownership and control” as the 
defining characteristic of large American firms in their 1933 book.24  
Some economists such as John Kenneth Galbraith25 and management 
guru Peter Drucker26 lent academic support to the proposition that 
this was an advancement compared to earlier stages of capitalism 
dominated by the owners of corporations.27  In the words of modern 
critics Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, it was thought that 
“professional corporate managers could serve as disinterested 
technocratic fiduciaries who would guide business corporations to 
perform in ways that would serve the general public interest.”28  As 
Berle explained in a widely noted exchange with law-and-economics 
pioneer Henry Manne in 1962, the capital market was hardly an 
important constraint on managers in those days, given that contests 
for corporate control were unusual and firms rarely needed external 
equity finance.29  While the discussion about the purpose of the 
corporation was still dominated by concerns about the role of 
powerful managers,30 the idea of the “public interest” role of the 
corporation and corporate law remained stronger than today.  
Corporate law trailed this ascendance of managerialism, as 
 
 23  See DAVIS, supra note 19, at 72–77 (describing managerial dominance during 
this period); DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM 108–11 (2005).  For 
contemporary accounts of the “managerial revolution,” see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., 
THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); JOHN 
KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (4th ed. 1985). 
 24  ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 69–118 (1933). 
 25  GALBRAITH, supra note 23.  For a discussion of the goals of the “Galbraithian” 
corporation, see Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Evolution of the Modern Corporation: 
Corporate Governance Reform in Context, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (working paper 
at 32–39), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136044. 
 26  See PETER F. DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
ORDER 340–43 (1950). 
 27  See Alan Dignam & Michael Galanis, Corporate Governance and the Importance of 
Macroeconomic Context, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL. STUD. 201, 222 (2008) (explaining that the 
left saw managerialism as positive because it reduced the power of elite families, 
while the right welcomed it because society became more meritocratic). 
 28  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 444; see also O’Kelley, supra note 25, 
at 35 (describing how corporate “technostructures” were rarely motivated solely by 
profit-making). 
 29  Adolf A. Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 
438–47 (1962); see also GORDON DONALDSON, CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 57–70 
(1994) (explaining that up to the 1970s, large firms financed expansion projects 
through retained earnings rather than stock issues). 
 30  Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation?  Shareholder-
Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 NYU J. L. & BUS. 641, 671 (2011). 
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developments in both statutory and case law made it harder for 
shareholders to challenge management decisions.31  Even just before 
1980, “corporate governance structures . . . gave the managers of the 
large public corporations little reason to focus on shareholder 
concerns.”32 
Around 1980, corporations began to move toward a shareholder-
centric model, which was brought about by two developments in the 
institutional structure of corporate governance.33  Hostile takeovers 
began to shake up corporate America.34  Innovations in banking, such 
as the development of junk bonds and the proliferation of leveraged 
buyouts, played an important role.35  As predicted by Henry Manne in 
1965, the threat of being ousted by a hostile bidder created incentives 
for management to run the company efficiently36 instead of, say, 
engaging in empire building and creating unwieldy conglomerates 
that did not contribute to shareholder wealth creation.  On the 
academic level, agency theory, jump-started by Michael Jensen and 
William Meckling’s famous 1976 article,37 found its way into the 
academy and into the hearts and minds of economists as well as 
business and legal scholars.  Hence, a changing paradigm in business 
education began to align the professed managerial objective with 
shareholder wealth maximization.38  When the takeover market 
declined during the early 1990s, incentive-based executive 
compensation began to expand dramatically and to focus more on 
 
 31  Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, the Cold War, and 
the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
(forthcoming 2013) (working paper at 35–41), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2143397. 
 32  Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity: 
Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 123 (2001). 
 33  See Davis, supra note 14, at 1127–29; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Folklore of Investor 
Capitalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1970, 1973 (1997) (“No one doubts that managements 
are much more constrained today by investor preference . . . .”). 
 34  See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 32, at 124–27 (providing data about the 
prevalence of takeovers). 
 35  See DAVIS, supra note 19, at 81–87; SKEEL, supra note 23, at 111–16; John 
Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?—The 
Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1755 (2007); 
Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 873–74 (2002). 
 36  Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110, 112–14 (1965). 
 37  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 13; see also JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE 
RATIONAL MARKET 160–71 (2009); KHURANA, supra note 14, at 317–26. 
 38  See KHURANA, supra note 14, at 305–23; see also DAVIS, supra note 19, at 87–93 
(arguing that a shareholder-based corporate governance system replaced a 
managerial system); KHURANA, supra note 14, at 297–305 (same); Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 6, at 440–41 (same). 
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aligning incentives with share price.  Thus, the professed alignment 
of managers’ interests with shareholder interests remained in place.39 
Shareholder primacy is of course not free of problems, which 
has led to its criticism and, sometimes, outright rejection.  First, the 
scandals of the early 2000s—such as Enron and WorldCom—have led 
to the observation that the contemporary corporate governance 
system is inherently unstable due to the large disparity in power 
between management and diffuse investors.40  The events leading up 
to the current “great recession” have further exacerbated concerns 
that at least some aspects of shareholder orientation may have 
detrimental consequences, particularly in the financial industry.41  
More fundamentally, it has often been argued that hostile takeovers 
and executive compensation, as currently implemented in most firms, 
do not actually serve the shareholder interest or that they guide the 
incentives of directors too strongly toward short-term share-value 
maximization.  Some have argued that short-term pressures from 
capital markets in general have been a leading cause of the financial 
crisis.42 
Second, the shift toward shareholder capitalism has also had an 
impact on how firms interact with their employees.  Labor power was 
at its peak from the 1950s through the 1970s, maybe, in part, because 
labor was a scarce resource.43  Looking back in 1994, business scholar 
Gordon Donaldson argued that economic and social pressures forced 
management to serve the economic interests of all major 
constituencies of the firm, including employees, managers, and 
others.44  While the pre-1980 structure favored the “career jobholder” 
 
 39  Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 884 (suggesting that executive compensation 
creates an incentive to bargain for a high bid price); see also Holmstrom & Kaplan, 
supra note 32, at 123 (pointing out that pay-for-performance plans before the 1980s 
were typically tied to accounting measures and not share price).  But see Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 71 (2003); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay without Performance: 
Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647 (2005) (arguing that executive compensation 
serves rent-seeking by management). 
 40  Mark J. Roe, The Inevitable Instability of American Corporate Governance, 1 CORP. 
GOV. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005). 
 41  E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. 
L. J. 247, 269–74 (2010) (suggesting that executive pay packages resulted in excessive 
risk-taking in the financial industry). 
 42  See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265 (2012); Kent Greenfield, The Puzzle of Short-Termism, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 629–30 (2011). 
 43  See, e.g., DIGNAM & GALANIS, supra note 22, at 200–01, 222–23 (describing labor 
bargaining power at its peak); DONALDSON, supra note 29, at 161. 
 44  DONALDSON, supra note 29, at 19. 
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interest in sustained corporate growth, the pendulum subsequently 
began to swing toward the financial interest of shareholders.45  
Modern economic theory provides us with an account of why, at least 
under certain circumstances, a “balancing board” of the pre-1980 
type that is not only beholden to the shareholder interest may, at 
least under certain circumstances, be economically efficient.  Not 
only shareholders, but also other corporate constituencies may be the 
corporation’s residual claimants and should therefore be taken into 
account in the debate about the overarching goals of corporate 
governance.  Employees, most of all, are often thought to be relevant 
as a matter of policy because of the specific human capital they 
sometimes contribute.46  In Blair and Stout’s team production model 
of corporate law, the board of directors is seen as a mediating 
hierarchy, standing between shareholders and other corporate 
constituencies.  Without a strong slant in favor of any particular 
group, directors are positioned to assign the rents produced by the 
corporation to all groups, thus permitting specific investment and 
allowing long-term business development.47  Opportunistic “hold up” 
of other team members by shareholders with a short-term orientation 
is therefore made more difficult.48  In this model, the attenuation of 
shareholder control over directors is seen as an advantage, since it 
facilitates specific investment by non-shareholder groups and the 
long-term development of the corporation.49  As noted by Jeffrey 
 
 45  Id. at 12, 17, 165–68. 
 46  See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL 
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 55–59 (2006) (arguing that workers are residual 
claimants like shareholders because of pension benefits and their inability to 
diversify). 
 47  Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 288–89 (1999); see also Dignam & Galanis, supra note 27, at 221 
(“[d]ispersed ownership emerged . . . with a management unconstrained by 
shareholders and with a greater discretion to share resources with stakeholders.”); 
Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats, 14 J. 
MGMT. INQUIRY 96, 99–101 (2005), available at http://bsfrey.ch./articles/412_05.pdf; 
Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and 
Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 
136–43 (2009); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 
Q. J. ECON. 387, 404–06, 423–24 (1998). 
 48  Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 
795–97 (2007).  Institutional investors specifically are often criticized as having short-
term objectives.  See, e.g., Jacoby, supra note 19, at 285. 
 49  See Blair & Stout, supra note 47; see also Kent Greenfield, The Impact of “Going 
Private” on Corporate Stakeholders, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 75, 86 (2008) (“If 
management is more autonomous, it is possible for managers to use their autonomy 
to allocate more of the corporate surplus to employees and other stakeholders.”); see 
also LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 52–54, 86, 91 (2012) (suggesting a 
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Gordon, the Blair and Stout story seems to provide a good fit for the 
role played by the “managerial” board of the 1950s.50  Firms were 
effectively run by top management, particularly CEOs, who had little 
reason to emphasize the interests of shareholders over those of other 
corporate “constituencies.” 
Corporate law still reflects the managerialist world;51 a 
prominent example is the board’s wide discretion to defend against 
hostile takeovers,52 which has often been criticized by shareholder 
primacists.53  To this day, direct shareholder influence on managerial 
decision-making is lower in the United States than in European 
corporate governance systems.54  While it would be obviously wrong to 
equate shareholder primacy with shareholder power, there are 
reasons to believe that pro-shareholder mechanisms such as 
“modern” executive compensation are often cosmetic and do not 
actually benefit shareholders all that much.  But clearly, a lot has 
changed since 1980.  As Gordon points out, the role of the board of 
directors has shifted from a managerial board to the contemporary 
monitoring board, whose professed objective is to monitor 
management on behalf of shareholders.55  Moreover, the temporary 
prevalence of hostile takeovers and the rise of equity-based executive 
 
new line of criticism analogous to the “Tragedy of the Commons,” according to 
which shareholder primacy policies may also be harmful because corporations 
focusing on shareholder wealth will be more successful in the short run, while 
hurting the economy overall by reducing the value of other investments and 
depleting long-run development potential). 
 50  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States 1950–
2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1513 (2007). 
 51  E.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Power and Purpose in the “Anglo-American” 
Corporation, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 579, 593–603 (2010) (describing how Delaware law 
remains at least partly committed to managerial governance); Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, 
Legitimating Power: The Changing Status of the Board of Directors, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM, 
supra note 18, at 60, 76–77. 
 52  Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (finding that the 
board has the power to issue a poison pill, commonly known as the poison pill, which 
is subject to the business judgment rule); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (stating that takeover defense must be “reasonable . . . to 
the threat posed”); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995) 
(defense must be coercive or preclusive to fail the Unocal test); see, e.g., William T. 
Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on 
Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1086 (2002) (“Moran . . . and 
Unocal . . . upheld the primacy of directorial power . . . .”). 
 53  E.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 
26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 512 (2001). 
 54  Sofie Cools, The Real Difference in Corporate Law Between the United States and 
Continental Europe: Distribution of Powers, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 697, 736–50 (2005); Gelter, 
supra note 47, at 148–51, 156–61. 
 55  Gordon, supra note 50, at 1514 n.187. 
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compensation must have shifted the balance toward shareholders at 
least to some extent, since these instruments set incentives closer to 
shareholder interests than to those of employees.  But even if all of 
these changes were without effect, shareholder primacy has won as an 
idea explaining how large corporations ought to be governed.56  All 
reform proposals have to be justified in the language of shareholder 
primacy. 
III. FROM DEFINED BENEFIT TO DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 
A second, maybe even more consequential, shift occurred 
during the same period beginning in the 1970s, specifically in the 
private pension system.  Part A describes the change and provides 
data for the transformation of the pension system, and Part B 
explores its reasons. 
A. The Empirical Facts 
In the period approximately between 1920 and the 1970s, large 
employers provided a comprehensive set of benefits, such as 
retirement and health insurance, to workers.57  Specifically, coverage 
with employer-sponsored pension plans increased during the post-
war decades, primarily because of the growth of big business, the tax 
treatment of pensions, and collective bargaining.58 
Large employers typically introduced pension plans because 
unions and employees favored them.  Unions pushed for employer-
provided pension plans because Social Security benefits were 
considered grossly inadequate.59  Social Security, having been created 
during the New Deal, eroded quickly in the 1940s due to inflation.60  
 
 56  E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within a Theory of the 
Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 717 (1996) (“[T]he shareholder wealth maximization 
norm . . . has been fully internalized by American managers.”). 
 57  David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 
1601 (1996). 
 58  Steven Sass, The Development of Employer Retirement Income Plans: From the 
Nineteenth Century to 1980, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT 
INCOME 76, 83–85 (Gordon L. Clark & Alicia H. Munnell eds., 2007) [hereinafter: 
OXFORD HANDBOOK] (noting a “dramatic” expansion of coverage from 15% in 1940 
to approaching 50% in 1980); Munnell, infra note 60, at 363. 
 59  ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDÉN, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF 
401(K) PLANS 6 (2004). 
 60  STEVEN A. SASS, THE PROMISE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 120 (1997); see Alicia H. 
Munnell, Employer-Sponsored Plans: The Shift from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution, 
in OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 359 (“[V]oluntary employer-sponsored 
pensions play a major role in supplementing relatively modest pay-as-you-go public 
pensions . . . .”). 
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The predominant form of private pension was the DB plan, under 
which an employee receives a pension of a specified amount upon 
retirement.  Employers hoped that DBs would help to attract talented 
workers.  Unions were equally interested, because they typically 
negotiated the plans and were often able to control their 
administration when they took the form of a “Taft-Hartley” 
arrangement.61  Generous pension plans were thought to secure 
union support of labor peace.62 
An advantage of a DB plan for employees is that it is funded by 
the employer,63 who bears the investment risk: when the plan 
becomes underfunded, the employer has to fill the gap to allow it to 
fulfill specified pension obligations.  Employees bear risk when the 
plan is underfunded, uninsured, and the employer is financially 
unable to support it.64 
Traditional DB plans were designed to create an incentive for 
employees to stay in the same firm until retirement65: benefits were 
frequently defined in terms of a percentage of the income in the 
highest-paid years of employment, multiplied by a factor increasing 
with years of service.66  The strong weight on the last years in the 
career, typically the highest earning ones, resulted in an incentive to 
stay in the same company.67  An employee changing his job mid-
 
 61  See Teresa Ghilarducci, Organized Labor and Pensions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK, 
supra note 58, at 380, 391–93; SASS, supra note 60, at 124–42 (discussing the role of 
organized labor in the establishment of company pension plans); JAMES A. WOOTEN, 
THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 34–39 
(2004).  Regarding Taft-Hartley plans, see infra Part IV.C. 
 62  Sass, supra note 58, at 86. 
 63  E.g., Barry L. Friedman, Individual Accounts and the Continuing Debate over Social 
Security Reform in the United States, in RETHINKING THE WELFARE STATE 205, 220 (Martin 
Rein & Winfried Schmähl eds., 2004); Leora Friedberg & Michael T. Owyang, Not 
Your Father’s Pension Plan: The Rise of 401(k) and Other Defined Contribution Plans, FED. 
RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV., Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 23. 
 64  E.g., Friedman, supra note 63, at 220 (noting the risk of employer bankruptcy 
in a DB plan); see also Sass, supra note 58, at 87 (“If the employer went bust, so would 
the benefits of current and future pensioners.”). 
 65  See generally RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSION PLANS AND EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE 
10–29 (1997) (discussing how DB plans were used to create an implicit contract 
between employers and employees that resulted in low turnover). 
 66  In other cases, benefits were computed on the basis of a fixed dollar amount 
for each year of service.  E.g., EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP 
SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA 1 (2007); 
Munnell, supra note 60, at 365 (giving the example of 1.5% of final three-year 
average pay for each year of service, which adds up to 30 % of income for an 
employee with a twenty-year employment history with the firm); Edward A. Zelinsky, 
The Cash Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 687 (2000). 
 67  MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 2; Munnell, supra note 60, at 365; Sass, 
supra note 58, at 87 (explaining that typically pension claims only vested after ten 
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career risked losing substantial benefits.  For example, when leaving 
the firm at age forty-five with a claim to a monthly pension of one-
hundred dollars upon retirement, the employee would not lose that 
claim, but it would be put on hold until retirement twenty or thirty 
years later, without any adjustment to the time value of money.68 
All of this changed in the late 1970s, when employers gradually 
began to phase out DB plans and to replace them with DC plans such 
as the now ubiquitous 401(k) plans.69  These differ from DB plans in 
that the employer does not promise a pension payment based on a 
specific formula, but promises solely to make contributions to the 
worker’s retirement account.  Workers typically have some options 
regarding how to direct their investment, and consequently bear the 
investment risk.70  The employer has no subsequent funding 
obligation if the plan has no investment success. 
While DC plans dominated among pension plans with fewer 
than 100 participants even in the 1970s, subsequently DC plans 
completely eclipsed DB plans among larger plans.71  There were 
20,035 DB plans and 8,587 DC plans with more than 100 participants 
in 1975, but only 11,368 DB plans and 70,125 DC plans with more 
than 100 participants in 2006.  Figure 1 illustrates how DC plans 
eclipsed DB plans among large employers in the mid-1980s72: 
 
 
years with the same employer). 
 68  ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 39–40.  The administrative hassle resulting from 
switching may have further increased the incentive to stay with a particular firm, 
given that claims were not portable and employees needed to deal with all prior 
employers when retiring. 
 69  E.g., WOOTEN, supra note 61, at 278 (“As late as 1979, more than 80% of 
individuals who participated in a private retirement plan were in a defined-benefit 
plan.”); see also Barry L. Friedman, Individual Accounts and the Continuing Debate Over 
Social Security Reform in the United States, in RETHINKING THE WELFARE STATE: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PENSION REFORM 205, 220 (Martin Rein & Wilfried Schmähl 
eds., 2004). 
 70  E.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L. J. 451, 
458–61 (2004). 
 71  See generally MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 16. 
 72  US DEPT. OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN 
HISTORICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS (2009), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1975-2006historicaltables.pdf.  The surge in 2005 is 
the result of changes in reporting requirements and the Department of Labor’s 
counting method.  See id. at 31.  
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The total number of pension plan participants is perhaps even 
more illustrative.  As shown in Figure 2, the number of active 
















Figure 1: Number of pension plans with 100 or 
more participants











Figure 2: Number of active pension plan 
participants (in thousands)
Total Defined benefit plans Defined contribution plans
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More than 27 million American workers actively participated in DB 
plans in 1975.  Their number stagnated to barely less than 20 million 
by 2006.  By contrast, the number of active DC plan participants rose 
from a meager 11 million to almost 66 million.74  In relative terms, 
the roles of DB and DC plans reversed: While in 1981, 60% of 
pension beneficiaries relied solely on DB plans, in 2001 about 60% 
only had a DC plan.75 
The increase in pension plan assets is no less impressive, as 
shown by Figure 3.76  Interestingly, the value of assets owned by DB 
plans remained larger than those of DC plans up to the mid-1990s77: 
 
 
The development of pension assets is maybe the most interesting 
factor because it shows the significance of retirement savings as a 
branch of the financial industry that has grown in importance.  
Consider Figure 4, which shows the same data as a percentage of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States78: 
 
 74  The total number of members of DB plans increased from about 33 to 42 
million, whereas that of DC plans increased from 11.5 to almost 80 million. The 
comparison with the number of active members indicates that DB plans are being 
phased out, with an increasing proportion of members being retirees. 
 75  Munnell, supra note 60, at 365–66. 
 76  US DEPT. OF LAB., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., supra note 72. 
 77  A possible reason could be that the last generation of workers relying 
primarily on DB began to retire at that time. 








Figure 3: Pension plan assets (in millions of 
dollars) 
Total Defined benefit plans Defined contribution plans
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As a percentage of GDP, pension assets increased from less than 16% 
in 1975 to 42.42% in 2006, with a peak at more than 47% in 1999.  
The increase in the late 1990s and the subsequent sharp downturn 
are obviously explained by the dot.com bubble and the stock market 
decline when it burst. 
Concurrently, the financial dependence of senior citizens on 
private pension plans compared to other sources of income increased 
from the 1970s to the 1990s; while the share of income from Social 
Security payments stayed more or less the same at about 30%, the 
share of capital increased from about 30% to 40% from the 1970s to 
the 1990s.79  Thus, only comparing private pensions and Social 
Security, the relative importance of the latter decreased.80  Needless 
to say, for a vast number of Americans in the lower income brackets, 
it remains the main source of income after retirement.81  But for the 
 
U.S.GOVERNNENTSPENDING.COM, http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/us_gdp 
_history (last visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
 79  Sass, supra note 58, at 90; see also Munnell, supra note 60, at 364 (noting that 
Social Security typically provides workers with about 30% of pre-retirement income). 
 80  Jacob S. Hacker, Policy Drift: The Hidden Politics of US Welfare State Retrenchment, 
in BEYOND CONTINUITY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ADVANCED POLITICAL ECONOMIES 40, 
69 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2005) (showing a decrease of the 
significance of Social Security as a share of combined pension benefits from about 
50% in 1970 to less than 40% in 2001). 
 81  Id. at 64 (“The likelihood that a worker’s employer will offer a pension plan 
decreases dramatically with income . . . .”); see ATSUHIRO YAMADA, OECD LABOUR 
MKT. & SOC. POLICY OCCASIONAL PAPERS, THE EVOLVING RETIREMENT INCOME PACKAGE 
48 (Paper No. 63, 2002), available at http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5lgsjhvj7qvd.pdf?expires=1365543162&id=id&accn
ame=guest&checksum=F11D6F00C58B231F27F99C7CFEC2B9BE; Sass, supra note 







Figure 4: Pension assets as a percentage of GDP
Total Defined benefit plans Defined contribution plans
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middle and upper brackets, private pensions clearly increased in 
significance.  For the top 40% income earners among retirees, private 
pensions are a very important source of income.82 
The 401(k) plan and related pension savings vehicles such as the 
independent retirement account (IRA), allow their beneficiaries to 
choose and to allocate their pension wealth according to their 
personal risk preferences.  This provides future retirees with the 
impression of being in control over their financial well-being83 and 
may have contributed to the popularity of such plans.84  As shown in 
Tables 1 and 2, a large proportion of assets both in DB and DC plans 
are invested in equity85: 
 
Table 1.  Distribution of DB pension assets 
DB 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2008 2009 
Equity 36.5% 46.5% 51.7% 53.9% 54.4% 41.0% 37.2% 
Bonds 31.6% 28.8% 24.5% 23.2% 22.2% 35.0% 36.9% 
Cash items 10.1% 7.7% 6.6% 3.1% 2.2% 3.6% 3.2% 
Other assets 21.8% 17.0% 17.2% 19.8% 21.3% 20.5% 22.7% 
 
Table 2.  Distribution of DC pension assets 
DC 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2008 2009 
Equity 35.4% 38.4% 36.7% 29.2% 29.6% 27.2% 27.5% 
Bonds 15.8% 10.7% 5.9% 10.4% 5.9% 9.5% 8.2% 
Cash items 10.5% 10.8% 6.7% 7.1% 4.3% 6.3% 5.3% 
Other assets 38.3% 40.2% 50.7% 53.3% 60.2% 56.4% 59.0% 
 
In both cases, equity constitutes a large portion of the investment, 
whose proportion relative to the total, as can be seen by the decrease 
after 2007, is immediately affected by trends in the stock market.  
Conspicuously, the share (and absolute amount) of bonds is very 
 
earners, while low-income earners tend to rely on social security to a higher degree). 
 82  See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH, EDUC., & HUMAN SERVS. DIV., 
RETIREMENT INCOME: IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND 
PENSION REFORM, S. REP. NO. 97-81, at 25–26 (1997), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/he97081.pdf (providing data for 1994).  
 83  See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 71. 
 84  ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 29–30 (“[T]he defined contribution paradigm 
reflects . . . a conception which carries tremendous appeal in a culture which . . . 
places a high value on private property, individual autonomy, and self-sufficiency.”). 
 85  EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., PENSION INVESTMENT REPORT 14 (2010). 
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small in DC plans, whereas the share of the “other assets” category, 
which includes mutual funds, is very large.  Mutual funds, in turn, 
invest a large proportion of their assets in equity instruments.86  
Potential retirees are therefore to a greater extent dependent on the 
development of the stock market, and to a lesser extent, of the bond 
market.  The share of equity in DB plans is equally large or even 
larger if mutual funds are not taken into account.  But from an 
employee’s perspective, equity assets of a DB plan are very different.  
Given that the employer bears the investment risk, the stock market 
does not matter as long as the employer remains solvent. 
Equity is popular because it is the only type of investment to 
yield profits that are high enough “to make retirement income 
programs work.”87  Employee stock option plans (ESOPs) are a 
special case; firms may have good reasons to encourage employees to 
invest their retirement assets with them, for instance to create greater 
identification with the firm and to maximize shareholder wealth,88 or 
to overcome hurdles to bargaining with employees in times of 
economic transition.89  Just before the market downturn in 2001, in a 
number of large firms—including Proctor & Gamble, Coca-Cola, and 
General Electric—more than 75% of 401(k) plan assets consisted of 
company stock.90  As a consequence of scandals such as Enron and 
WorldCom, in which many employees lost most of their pensions, 
investment in company stock has decreased from 19% of all 401(k) 
assets in 1999 to 9% in 2009.91 
 
 86  E.g., MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 75. 
 87  SASS, supra note 60, at 249. 
 88  But see Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus, & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401(k) Plans, 50 J. L. & ECON. 45 
(2007) (providing evidence that employees systematically underestimate the risk of 
holding company stock, while employers overestimate the benefits of ESOPs); see also 
Joshua D. Rauh, Own company stock in defined contribution pension plans: A takeover 
defense?, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 379 (2006) (suggesting that company stock ownership is, 
among other reasons, encouraged by firms because it lowers the chance of success 
for hostile takeovers). 
 89  Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions: The Case of 
United Airlines, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—THE STATE OF THE ART AND 
EMERGING RESEARCH, 387, 393–95, 404–06 (Klaus Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (suggesting 
that ESOPs sometimes allow firms to trade stock ownership against high wages in 
order to make the employee share variable when high profits have become less 
certain). 
 90  David Millon, Enron and the Dark Side of Worker Ownership, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. 
JUST. 113, 118 (2002); MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 101. 
 91  EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 350, 23 (2010); MUNNELL & 
SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 113 (providing data stock losses for employees in 12 
companies in 2001–2002).  
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B. Reasons for the Shift 
No single explanation has emerged for the shift from DB to DC 
plans, but a number of factors that seem to have played a role have 
been identified.  The most important one is regulatory requirements 
intended to protect retirees, which made DB plans unattractive and 
costly for employers.  Several regulatory choices seem to be jointly 
responsible. 
1. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
Congress adopted the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) in 1974.  ERISA immediately resulted in the termination 
of many private benefit plans that became too costly for employers to 
maintain.92  ERISA ultimately led the United States down the path 
toward a “defined contribution society.”93 
ERISA imposed more severe regulatory burdens on DB plans 
than on DC plans.  A number of bankruptcies that left employees 
without pensions had raised public awareness that employees 
required better protection against underfunding.94  The most 
frequently cited example is the 1964 closing of the Studebaker 
automobile plant in South Bend, Indiana, which left 8,500 employees 
with no, or significantly reduced, retirement benefits.95  Critics argued 
that the computation of funding for promised future retirement 
benefits was actuarially complex.  Management was therefore in the 
position to use the resulting uncertainty about pension benefits to 
attract workers by sending the signal that the firm was offering high 
pensions, while in reality it was uncertain whether their successors 
several decades down the road would honor this promise.96 
Congress stepped in with a complicated statute to make sure 
employees actually got what they were promised.  First, DB plans were 
subjected to minimum funding rules, given that DB plans had 
previously often been woefully underfunded.97  Second, ERISA 
 
 92  BRUNO STEIN, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSIONS IN TRANSITION 84–85 (1980) 
(discussing and giving data about plan terminations after ERISA).  
 93  ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 38; see also Sylvester J. Schieber, Richard Dunn, & 
David L. Wray, The Future of the Defined Contribution Revolution, in LIVING WITH DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS 273 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester J. Schieber eds., 1998). 
 94  SASS, supra note 60, at 202–13 (discussing the legislative process that led to the 
enactment of ERISA). 
 95  See SASS, supra note 60, at 183–86; MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 8; 
WOOTEN, supra note 61, at 51–79. 
 96  Munnell, supra note 60, at 367; ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 43. 
 97  See, e.g., E. PHILIP DAVIS, PENSION FUNDS 99 (1995); SASS, supra note 60, at 186 
(reporting that union-bargained DB plans only had an average funding ratio of 
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introduced mandatory vesting standards, under which employees 
have non-forfeitable rights to a specified percentage of benefits 
depending on the number of years of service.98  Third, firms not only 
had to comply with administrative and accounting requirements, but 
also contribute to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) 
to insure pension benefits.99  Fourth, ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty 
on trustees managing the plan assets,100 which exposes employers to a 
liability risk.  With this heavy burden on DB plans, DC plans became 
relatively more attractive.101 
Employers also began to see the potential of selling their stock to 
employees in the form of ESOPs in order to align the interests of 
employees and shareholders.102  These are easier to set up in the form 
of a DC plan, since ERISA established a 10% limit on the acquisition 
of the employer’s own stock that applies only to DB plans.103 
2. § 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code 
The second important legislative development was § 401(k) of 
the Internal Revenue Code, which was adopted by Congress in 1978.  
Like ERISA, it was not a conscious regulatory choice intended to 
make DC plans more attractive, but was rather intended to solve the 
controversy under what circumstances deferred salaries that are paid 
into a pension plan should be taxed in the year when work is 
performed and the plan is funded, or when the employee receives 
the actual payment.104 
 
60%).  Obviously, DC plans are not subject to the funding requirement, given that 
employers do not promise a particular benefit that could be funded.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1081(a)(8) (2006) (exempting “individual account plans,”—DC plans—from the 
funding requirement); see also PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT LAW 13 (2010) (describing additional requirements for DB plans and 
legislative motives for the differentiation). 
 98  29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006), see, e.g., STEIN, supra note 92, at 78–79. 
 99  Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (1974); 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1311 (2006); see Munnell, supra note 60, at 367; ZELINSKY, supra 
note 66, at 44.  The PBGC guarantees pension payments only up to a specific amount 
that also depends on the age at retirement (with lower guarantee for early retirees).  
See Maximum Monthly Guarantee Tables, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORP., 
http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximum-guarantee.html 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2013). 
 100  29 U.S.C. § 1001 et. seq. (1974); 28 U.S.C. § 1104. 
 101  See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 9; ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 46. 
 102  ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 47; see also Gordon, supra note 89, at 393–95, 404–
06 (suggesting that employee ownership allows firms to make part of employee 
compensation variable in times of economic transition). 
 103  29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2); § 1107(b)(1). 
 104  While the IRS argued for “constructive receipt” of elective deferred pay 
arrangements, and hence taxation in the year when the plan is funded, the contrary 
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Two aspects further made 401(k) plans more attractive to 
employers.  First, § 401(k) also allowed matching contributions by the 
employer to be deductible before taxes.105  Given this tax advantage, 
companies made matching contributions contingent on employees 
investing the funds in the employer’s stock.106  Second, these plans 
typically allow employees to control the funds in their own accounts 
and to direct them to investment vehicles in line with their personal 
preferences.107  ERISA encouraged the creation of “participant-
directed” DC plans because the employer or other persons 
designated as, or deemed to be, fiduciaries are not liable for 
investment losses that result from the beneficiaries’ choices.108  
Consequently, participant direction has become very common.  
Between 1988 and 2005, the share of participant-directed plans 
(among DC plans) increased from 10% to 67%, with these plans now 
accounting for 86% instead of 15% of participants.109 
3. The Changing Industrial Structure of the Economy 
The regulatory changes discussed so far followed, accompanied, 
or accelerated changes in the structure of the economy and how 
firms interacted with employees.  Labor economists have plausibly 
interpreted traditional DB plans and their peculiar design as a way of 
managing the workforce.  First, private pensions were initially 
 
view held that benefits should be taxed when they are received, i.e. during 
retirement, when the employee is typically in a lower tax bracket.  ZELINSKY, supra 
note 66, at 49–50.  Section 401(k) was passed as a compromise between the two 
positions by permitting a favorable tax treatment only when the employer 
implemented certain social policy goals such as non-discrimination between workers 
of different income levels for deferred compensation arrangement.  See I.R.C. 
§ 401(k)(3), (11) (2006).  While it was not initially clear whether the new statute 
could apply to pension plans, the IRS clarified the issue in a 1981 regulation.  
MICHAEL J. CLOWES, THE MONEY FLOOD: HOW PENSION FUNDS REVOLUTIONIZED 
INVESTING 188–90 (2000) (discussing the history of the regulation); MUNNELL & 
SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 5. 
 105  Richard A. Ippolito, Toward Explaining The Growth of Defined Contribution Plans, 
34 INDUS. REL. 1, 13–14 (1995); see I.R.C. § 401(m). 
 106  Millon, supra note 90, at 115; MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 101. 
 107  ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 51. 
 108  29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1).  It suffices if participants have the choice between 
three investment options.  See, e.g., WIEDENBECK, supra note 97, at 136–38; ZELINSKY, 
supra note 66, at 51; Michael E. Murphy, Pension Plans and the Prospects of Corporate Self-
Regulation, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 503, 549 (2007) (“[S]ection 404(c) effectively 
relieves the corporate sponsor of fiduciary responsibility for the plan . . . .”). 
 109  William E. Even & David A. MacPherson, Growth of Participant Direction in 
Defined Contribution Plans, 49 INDUS. REL. 190, 196 (2010); see id. at 194, 206 
(suggesting that the possibility to escape 404(c) fiduciary liability has played a role, 
albeit not the only one); see also Schieber et al., supra note 93, at 275.  
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introduced to set incentives for employees to retire at the age 
preferred by the firm.110  Second, as pointed out above, DB plans 
helped to tie workers to their employer by inhibiting job changes.111  
Third, the underfunding of DB plans very likely prevented unions 
from “holding up” the employer.112  Underfunding creates a strong 
deterrent for unions against driving a very hard bargain vis-à-vis the 
employer.  A large outflow of assets to current workers would likely 
endanger the firm’s future ability to supplement the funding gap, 
and thus make it less likely that retirement benefits could be fully 
paid.  On the other side of the bargaining table, unions tended to 
favor DB plans because of the cohesive effects they had on the 
workforce and because it put them into the central position of 
negotiating the DB formula with the employer.113  Obviously, ERISA’s 
funding and vesting requirements made this balance more difficult to 
sustain;114 furthermore, the inflation of the 1970s destroyed the 
amount of the “bond,” namely, the underfunded amount.115  These 
factors in combination undermined the rationale for DB plans. 
Initially, business leaders and unions were skeptical of many 
regulatory elements proposed for pension reform.116  ERISA was 
largely the product of eager reformers in Congress who put aside 
interest group politics and responded to public opinion, which had 
increasingly become concerned about workers left without pensions 
after bankruptcies.117 
 
 110  WOOTEN, supra note 61, at 20–21.  
 111  Supra Part III.A. 
 112  Richard A. Ippolito, The Economic Function of Underfunded Pension Plans, 28 J.L. 
& ECON. 611, 615–16 (1985).  In economic parlance, “hold up” makes reference to a 
situation where two actors are in a long-term relationship, in which at least one of 
them has made a specific investment on which it expects to receive a return.  The 
other party can threaten to exit the relationship in order to expropriate the quasi-
rent on the investment.  In an employment relationship there may be hold up 
opportunities for both parties. 
 113  ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 33–34. 
 114  SASS, supra note 60, at 210 (explaining that workers would still get the pension 
if union demands bankrupted the employer). 
 115  Ippolito, supra note 112, at 629. 
 116  SASS, supra note 60, at 200, 202; WOOTEN, supra note 61, at 100–01 (explaining 
resistance by both business and union leaders in an advisory committee rejecting 
proposals made by the Kennedy administration in 1963).  But see SASS, supra note 60, 
at 215 (explaining that by the early 1970s, the CIO had become “the only powerful 
interest group that supported reform”).  Unions were split on the issue of vesting, 
which was seen as desirable by those in industry dominated by single-employer plans, 
but was seen as detrimental by unions controlling multi-employer plans.  See 
WOOTEN, supra note 61, at 142–43. 
 117  SASS, supra note 60, at 218–19; see also WOOTEN, supra note 61, at 177–78 
(describing efforts to obtain union support for ERISA). 
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The significance of unions generally, and industries in which the 
pension bargain of the type described above was struck specifically, 
has decreased significantly since the 1970s.  Union membership in 
the American workforce plummeted from 35% in 1953 to 9% in 
2003.118  Econometric studies have found that about half of the shift 
between 1979 and 1989 can be explained by “a reduction in the 
employment share in firms and industries that had relatively strong 
preferences for defined benefit plans.”119  Losses for DB plans 
occurred mainly among non-unionized workers.120  Thus, DC plans 
also began to be used for personnel management purposes: § 401(k) 
allows firms to match the additional contributions of workers,121 
which enables them to reward those with a high propensity to save.  
This may allow firms to identify better workers, the theory being that 
these individuals are more often able to defer gratification to the 
future.122 
Trade liberalization in manufacturing may also have eliminated 
rents that could be assigned to labor, and thus led to pressures to cut 
costs.123  Decreased job tenure and stagnant wages further undercut 
the rationale for DB plans.124  In part, the shift toward DC plans may 
thus have been a response to a development that was already on the 
way.  At least in part, however, the legislative changes outlined in the 
preceding parts contributed to the change independently, since they 
led to DB plans becoming less attractive due unintended 
consequences of these laws. 
4. Redistributive Pension Plan Terminations 
The final explanation is the least benign one: during the 1980s, 
it became financially attractive for firms to terminate DB pension 
 
 118  Ghilarducci, supra note 61, at 384; see also SASS, supra note 60, at 229, 239; 
Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 
U. PA. L. REV. 581, 613, 634 (2007). 
 119  Ippolito, supra note 105, at 18; see also Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L. 
Steinmeier, The Stampede Toward Defined Contribution Pension Plans: Fact or Fiction?,  31 
INDUS. REL. 361 (1992) (explaining that about half of the shift was caused by changes 
in employment in different industries); see also ZELINSKY, supra note 66, at 33; see also 
SASS, supra note 60, at 229. 
 120  Ippolito, supra note 105, at 9–10.  
 121  For instance, a 401(k) plan might have a base contribution of 5% made by the 
employee and an additional 5% made by the employer.  If the employee decided to 
save another percent, the firm can then decide to match that contribution by paying 
another (tax-deductible) percent into the plan. 
 122  See Ippolito, supra note 105, at 14; IPPOLITO, supra note 65, at 85; see also 
Richard A. Ippolito, Stayers as “Workers” and “Savers”, 37 J. HUMAN RES. 275 (2002). 
 123  See Gordon, supra note 18, at 1524–33. 
 124  See id. at 1544–46.  
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plans in a move called “termination for reversion.”  Many DB plans 
had become overfunded, i.e. the trust held a larger amount of assets 
than was needed to cover expected pension payments.125  Firms used 
the opportunity to terminate DB plans and create DC plans instead, 
while taking the excess value of the plan assets (over the net present 
value of the pension payments) into corporate profits.126  Legally, 
plan terminations were made possible by a 1983 ruling by the IRS 
(encouraged by the Department of Labor), which clarified that plan 
terminations were permissible not only in narrow cases of “business 
necessity,” but also generally, as long as the employer bought an 
annuity for the existing benefits from an insurance company.127 
In the words of the labor economist Richard Ippolito, the 
“ruling dramatically altered the defined benefit pension contract,” 
since it allowed employers to terminate plans outside of financial 
distress in order to create profits.128  For workers, a termination meant 
that future payouts no longer depended on their salaries at the end 
 
 125  One major reason was high interest rates that depressed the discounted value 
of pensions.  Mitchell A. Petersen, Pension Reversions and Worker-Stockholder Wealth 
Transfers, 107 Q. J. ECON. 1033, 1035 (1992); Margaret M. Blair, The Great Pension Grab: 
Comments on Richard Ippolito, Bankruptcy and Workers: Risks, Compensation and Pension 
Contracts, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1305, 1307 (2004).  In the 1990s, a soaring stock market 
continued to make DB plans look overfunded in spite of lower interest rates. 
 126  Richard A. Ippolito, Tenuous Property Rights: The unraveling of defined benefit 
contracts in the US, in PENSION POLICY IN AN INTEGRATING EUROPE 175, 176 (Onorato 
Castellino & Elsa Fornero eds., 2003); 
see also Norman P. Stein, Reversions from Pension Plans: History, Policies, and Prospects, 44 
TAX L. REV. 259, 277–79 (1989) (surveying legal methods of pension plan 
terminations under the tax code). 
 127  See Ippolito, supra note 126.  Until 1983, the Internal Revenue Code had 
prohibited payouts to employers until all employee claims were satisfied.  26 I.R.C. 
§ 401(a)(2).  Funds remaining in the plan could only be captured by the employer in 
cases of actuarial error.  25 C.F.R. § 1.401-2(b)(1).  A termination was permissible 
only in narrowly defined situations of “business necessity” (i.e. financial distress).  
Rev. Rul. 71-152, 1971-1 C.B. 126 (1971); Richard A. Ippolito, Bankruptcy and Workers: 
Risks, Compensation and Pension Contracts, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 1251, 1287 (2004); see also 
Stein, supra note 126, at 261, 293 (discussing the historical context of the ruling).  
The IRS’s 1983 ruling made it clear that plan terminations purely made for the 
purpose of capturing a reversion were permissible if the employer bought an annuity 
for the existing benefits from an insurance company.  Rev. Rul. 83-52, 1983-1 C.B. 87 
(1983).  See Ippolito, supra note 126; WIEDENBECK, supra note 97, at 279; Stein, supra 
note 126, at 261–62, 282.  It also allowed firms to use less conservative assumptions 
when computing a plan’s amount of liabilities.  See Stein, supra note 126, at 305–06. 
 128  Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1287; see also Charny, supra note 57, at 1613, 1629 
(suggesting that employers reneged on implicit deals with workers by cutting benefits 
after LBOs); Stein, supra note 126, at 262 (explaining that the 1983 ruling reflected a 
new understanding of the tax code that protected only employee benefits accrued at 
the time of termination, but did not protect expectations under an implicit contract 
relating to future wage increases and adjustment to inflation).  
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of their careers, but rather at the time of the plan’s termination.129  
Furthermore, the funding risk for future pension contributions was 
shifted from shareholders to employees (and the PBGC).130 
Terminations often happened after a leveraged buyout (LBO),131 
an acquisition that burdens the target firm with debt taken out to 
finance the purchase.  Not only do LBOs often create strong 
pressures to cut costs at the expense of employees, but reversions in 
particular were seen as permitting raiders to violate implicit contracts 
with workers by taking the profit instead of using it to enhance 
pension benefits.132  In many cases, reversions seem to have resulted 
in considerable redistribution from workers to shareholders, since 
employees seemingly were not compensated for the higher risk of 
default.133  There were about 585 terminations between 1980 and 
1985, and more than 1,500 in 1986 alone.134  Between 1980 and 1989, 
1,635 plans were terminated, yielding an aggregate of $18 billion 
(corresponding to 45% of these plans’ assets) to employers.135  
Admittedly, most DB plans were shut down in the context of factory 
closures, but about one-third were pure asset reversions that seem to 
support a redistributive theory.136 
From 1986 onwards, Congress attempted to protect plans from 
terminations by imposing a reversion tax.137  The long-term effect, 
however, was to make DB plans even more unattractive to 
employers.138  Employers reacted by reducing the target funding 
 
 129  Richard A. Ippolito & William H. James, LBO, Reversions, and Implicit Contracts, 
47 J. FIN. 139, 142 (1992); Stein, supra note 126, at 276. 
 130  Blair, supra note 125, at 1306–07. 
 131  Ippolito & James, supra note 129; see also CLOWES, supra note 104, at 187–88 
(discussing individual cases of LBO-financed plan reversions).  
 132  Gordon, supra note 18, at 1543. 
 133  See Blair, supra note 125, at 1308–09 (discussing the relative costs of risk-
bearing incurred by shareholders and employees). 
 134  Ippolito, supra note 126, at 177. 
 135  Stein, supra note 126, at 259–60.  
 136  Ippolito, supra note 126, at 182; see also Petersen, supra note 125, at 1052 (firms 
where the pension bond is the largest are most likely to be affected by a reversion, 
which lends support to the transfer theory). 
 137  Richard A. Ippolito, Reversion Taxes, Contingent Benefits, and the Decline in 
Pension Funding, 44 J.L. & ECON. 199, 200 (2001).  The tax was originally 10%, but 
subsequently increased to 15% in 1988 and to 50% in 1990.  Ippolito, supra note 127, 
at 1288; Stein, supra note 126, at 262–63, 320. 
 138  Ippolito, supra note 137, at 203–04 (explaining that the reversion tax 
discourages excess funding of DB plans because it makes it expensive to remove 
excess assets).  Ippolito also points out that Congress, in 1986, passed legislation that 
disallowed overfunding a plan by more than 150% (without losing the associated tax 
benefits), although the effect of the limit is small compared to the tax.  Id. at 204, 
218–19; I.R.C. § 412(c)(7); 29 U.S.C. § 1082(c)(7), as amended by P.L. 100-203, Dec. 
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ratios and ultimately by converting DB plans into cash balance plans, 
allowing them to avoid the tax penalty.139 
IV. EFFECTS ON EMPLOYEES’ HUMAN CAPITAL AND PENSION WEALTH 
The transformation of the American pension system came about 
not through deliberate planning, but largely as an unintended 
consequence of regulation that was primarily intended to protect 
workers.140  This Part proceeds by explaining why this had important 
consequences for both workers and corporate governance, describes 
the tradeoff between the two assets employees have in an 
employment relationship—namely human capital and pension 
wealth (discussed in Part IV.A), and explains their exposure to 
varying risks under different pension systems (Parts IV.B and IV.C).  
Parts IV.D and IV.E retrace the changes in the tradeoff resulting from 
the shift from DB to DC plans and suggest that this fundamentally 
changed the impact pro-investor corporate governance policies have 
on workers. 
A. The Tradeoff 
Consider the situation of a middle-class employee.  Very broadly 
speaking, most of us cover our living expenses from two sources.  
First, we typically rely on a constant income stream to make a living, 
most of which comes from employed labor.  We therefore care not 
only about our current job, but also about our education, skills, and 
 
22, 1987, 101 Stat. 1330. 
 139  Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1288–89.  While cash balance plans are formally 
DB plans where the employer guarantees a specified amount, each employee is 
assigned a fictitious account with a monetary value corresponding to his pension 
claim, thus making the plan look much like a DC plan.  E.g., Friedman, supra note 
63, at 221; GEORGE A. (SANDY) MACKENZIE, THE DECLINE OF THE TRADITIONAL PENSION 
55 (2010).  A conversion is therefore not considered a termination, but an 
amendment to the plan.  Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1289 n.41. 
 140  Once the idea was established, investment vehicles functioning on the same 
principle were created and began to spread widely.  Individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs), which are endowed with tax advantages to provide similar tax advantages for 
individuals not covered by pension plans, became available as an investment vehicle 
to anyone in 1981.  Economic Recovery Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34 (1981).  Even 
though their tax advantages were again limited to low-income earners in 1986 (Tax 
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986)), but they continued to proliferate.  ZELINSKY, 
supra note 66, at 52–58.  Other examples include health savings accounts, which 
allow those that have high-deductible health insurance to save for medical expenses, 
and Educational Savings Accounts.  See Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement 
and Modernization Act, P.L. 108-173 (2003) (superseding the older Medical Savings 
Accounts); I.R.C. § 529 (educational savings accounts).  See also ZELINSKY, supra note 
66, at 60–70, 83–84 (discussing various types of investment vehicles).  In each case, 
the investment risk is borne by the individual. 
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abilities; in other words, the potential to earn a living in the future.  
The expected present value from this can be referred to as our 
human capital in a broad sense,141 and we should deeply care about 
policies affecting our earnings potential.  Second, we rely on savings 
to cover our expenses when we fall on hard times, such as a period of 
unemployment, or when we are no longer able or willing to work.  
Retirement savings are the most important component.  We 
therefore care about policies that affect our pension plans, which is 
why it is valuable to explore both human and financial capital more 
deeply.  The tradeoff between these two sources is of crucial 
importance to the shareholder primacy debate.  Employees’ human 
capital interest, resulting from rent-seeking or returns on specific 
human capital investment, is generally less secure when managers in 
a corporation are strongly focused on maximizing shareholder 
wealth.  Because of the rise of DC plans, however, pro-shareholder 
policies have gained in relative importance compared to pro-
employee policies that protect their position with a particular 
employer. 
B. Human Capital and Pension Plans 
Employees typically prefer to stay at their current jobs unless 
others offer clear advantages.  There are basically two possible 
reasons for this.  First, employees may be able to extract rents from 
their employers.  It is often costly for employers to hire and train new 
employees.  Incumbents may therefore have some bargaining power 
to obtain wages and benefits above their marginal product.  Unions 
and legal institutions that enhance employees’ power may allow 
employees to organize and to extract rents from employers 
collectively.142  In a corporation, these rents reduce profits for 
shareholders. 
Second, employees may have a human capital investment in 
their current jobs in the form of skills and training.  According to 
economic theory, human capital can be general, i.e. useful in a wide 
range of occupations.  It can be industry-specific, meaning that the 
acquired skills are applicable across a range of similar or equivalent 
jobs in different firms.  It can also be firm-specific, meaning that it is 
 
 141  See, generally, Burton A. Weisbrod, The Valuation of Human Capital, 69 J. POL. 
ECON. 425, 427 (1961) (defining human capital as expected future earnings). 
 142  Much of the corporate law literature seems to favor this interpretation.  E.g., 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence and Corporate 
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 150 (1999) (suggesting that German 
codetermination allows unions to extract rents from shareholders). 
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useful with a particular employer.143  Firm-specific investment is 
beneficial when workers are able to do their jobs more quickly and 
efficiently, make fewer mistakes, and create higher-quality products, 
thus rendering the firm more competitive.144  Firm-specific human 
capital obviously includes skills to perform a particular job, e.g. to use 
a particular machine.  Few skills may be useful to only one 
employment relationship, but idiosyncratic combinations of skills 
may be.145  In this case, particular subsets of skills, but not the whole 
package, may be transferable given that no other job requires the 
same combination.  In other cases, the employee’s specific skill may 
be of an organizational nature.  In the context of pension contracts, 
Richard Ippolito gives the example of a worker who “has worked with 
the same people for a long time, and really knows how to create 
teams that work together for different types of jobs.”146  In other 
words, employees may also need to learn to work within a different 
corporate culture or organizational structure and how to navigate it 
to be as effective as possible.147 
The role of pension plans in the employer-employee 
relationship depends on who pays for the creation of human capital.  
If the employer pays for the employee’s training, he will want to make 
sure that the employee stays at least until the employer has recovered 
his investment.  Individual employees can threaten to leave in order 
to extract higher wages or other advantages from the employer.148  If a 
 
 143  GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 11–36 (1964); see also HENRY HANSMANN, THE 
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 26 (1996); James M. Malcomson, Individual Employment 
Contracts, in 3 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 2291, 2311–37 (Orley Aschenfelter & 
David Card eds., 1999) (reviewing the literature on contractual protection of specific 
investment); David Neumark, Productivity, Compensation, and Retirement, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK, supra note 58, at 721, 722; Larry Fauver & Michael E. Fuerst, Does good 
corporate governance include employee representation? Evidence from German corporate boards, 
82 J. FIN. ECON. 673, 679 (2006). 
 144  See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Toward a New Law and Economics, GEO. WASH. 
LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO. 495, at 51 (2010) (suggesting that firms financed by 
venture capitalists thrive when there is substantial human capital in these firms), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557730. 
 145  EDWARD P. LAZEAR, INSIDE THE FIRM 342 (2011) (giving the example of work in 
a tax software company requiring knowledge of computer programming, economics, 
and tax law). 
 146  Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1254; see also Egon Franck, Stephan Nüesch, & Jan 
Pieper, Specific Human Capital as a Source of Superior Team Performance, 63 
SCHMALENBACH BUS. REV. 376, 377–81 (2011) (discussing team-specific capital). 
 147  John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 
85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 74 (1986).  
 148  See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the 
Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 509–16 (1999) 
(suggesting that Japanese firms are able invest in employee training because these 
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trained group of employees is hard to replace, unions are in a good 
position to engage in rent-seeking.  DB pension plans tie employees 
to the employer and make it more difficult for them to “hold up” the 
firm; before ERISA, DB plans penalized individual employees who 
switched jobs.149  On the collective level, pervasive underfunding of 
DB plans made it more difficult for unions to drive a hard bargain.150  
Thus, pension arrangements in effect turned industry-specific skills 
into firm-specific skills, and consequently reduced employees’ 
potential to extract rents from the firm.  ERISA made this kind of 
arrangement impossible.151 
If the cost of the creation of firm-specific human capital is borne 
by employees, the situation is different.  Employees will only be 
willing to invest if there is a return, such as higher future wages, 
expanded benefits after a period of continuous employment, and a 
high likelihood of advancing in the corporate hierarchy.152  They may 
have an expectation to make a certain income within the firm, enjoy 
particular working conditions and benefits, and have certain career 
prospects if they do a good job.  From the perspective of human 
capital theory, all of these expectations are considered (quasi-)rents 
on an investment made early in the employment relationship.  A 
related, but not entirely identical issue is that employees may need to 
move to obtain a particular job.  Employers often cover relocation 
expenses to attract employees, since being in a particular location 
may also turn industry-specific skills into firm-specific ones.153  Some 
of the costs may not be recoverable, such as those of reorganizing 
one’s social life.154  Thus, while employees are in principle free to 
switch jobs, they may be de facto “locked in” with their current 
 
have no outside career options).  
 149  Supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 150  Supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text. 
 151  Furthermore, firms may prefer to confer benefits only to long-term, high-skill 
employees.  ERISA’s non-discrimination requirement prevents firms from targeting 
specific types of employees.  Charny, supra note 57, at 1622–23. 
 152  See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile 
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 37 (ALAN J. 
AUERBACH ed., 1988) (discussing implicit contracts between firms and employees); 
Charny, supra note 57, at 1606–07, 1608 (discussing the use of pension to encourage 
investment in employer-specific skills by employees).   
 153  See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN 
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 35 (1994) (quoting an engineer comparing the 
difficulty of getting another job in the same industry in Texas and in Silicon Valley). 
 154  In this context, economists speak of regionally immobile “social capital” that 
reduces worker mobility.  See Michael Bräuninger & Andreia Tolciu, Should I Stay or 
Should I Go?  Regional Mobility and Social Capital, 167 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 434, 434–
36 (2011). 
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employer.  Moving to a job in another region where the same skill set 
is required may be deterred by the cost of moving. 
The question, then, is how employees can obtain reasonable 
assurance that employers will not renege on worker expectations and 
engage in what is known as “hold up” in economic terminology.  As 
explained above, under the team production model of corporate law, 
the board of directors is in the position to balance the interests of the 
firm’s various constituencies. The board, therefore, may protect 
employees by shutting out shareholders, who may engage in holdup, 
from decision-making.155  This fits well with descriptions of how firms 
operated from the 1950s through the 1970s: the institutional goal of 
firms was not so much profit maximization as growth and continued 
survival.  Employees were fired less easily because of the demoralizing 
effects on the team.156 
In the labor economics literature, DB pension plans add another 
angle to the analysis, namely as part of a long-term, partly implicit 
contract that rewards loyalty with wages that increase with seniority.157  
DB plans create an incentive for promotion-achieving performance 
and firm-specific investment, given that they reward a long tenure in 
the firm and because pension payments depend on late-career salary 
(typically resulting from promotion within the firm).158  This is 
plausible when pension plans cannot be terminated because of legal 
hurdles, when they are entrenched because of deals with powerful 
unions, and when a managerialist board has no incentive to cut labor 
cost in order to create shareholder wealth. 
For the descriptive point about shareholder primacy, it is 
relatively unimportant whether the rent-seeking explanation or the 
human capital explanation is empirically more significant.159  It 
suffices to realize that employment constitutes an asset.  This asset’s 
value is the net present value of expected income streams—from 
 
 155  Supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text. 
 156  O’Kelley, supra note 25, at 35–36 (describing the goals of the “Galbraithian” 
technostructure). 
 157  Edward P. Lazear, Why is There Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1261 
(1979); Edward P. Lazear, The Future of Personnel Economics, 110 ECON. J. F611, F617–
F619 (2000); Friedberg & Owyang, supra note 63, at 27; Neumark, supra note 143, at 
723–24.  
 158  See, e.g., Neumark, supra note 143, at 724–25 (discussing the incentive set by 
DB plans for specific human capital investment); MACKENZIE, supra note 139, at 48–49 
(“Final-salary pension plans . . . create a powerful incentive for strong (or at least 
promotion achieving) performance on the job and loyalty to the firm, and reward 
the build-up of know-how that is specific to the firm.”). 
 159  See Neumark, supra note 143, at 725–26 (surveying the evidence for various 
theories about human capital). 
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future wages, benefits, and vacation time—in the current job, minus 
the equivalent income streams in the next best job.160  Margaret Blair 
estimates that the value of a job is considerable for employees, given 
that employees who are laid off in the course of a plant closing 
typically earn 10–15% less in their subsequent jobs.161  This figure 
should realistically vary between jobs, and it should be greater for 
employees with either better rent-seeking opportunities at the firm, 
or greater specific investment and therefore expectations to receive 
quasi-rents from continued employment.162  The bottom line for 
analyzing the politics of corporate governance is that employees have 
a desire to keep their jobs, and to support policies that foster and 
protect returns on their human capital. 
C. The Exposure of Pension Wealth to Risk 
While policies relating to their employment position are clearly 
important to workers, expected retirement benefits are their other 
major asset.  There are clear differences between DB and DC plans 
that influence employee preferences with respect to policies relating 
to pension wealth. 
In a DB plan, the employer bears the plan’s funding risk.  The 
major issue for employees is plan underfunding combined with the 
risk of the employer’s default.  ERISA addressed the issue with the 
requirement to set up a trust to hold pension assets.163  While firms 
had begun to set up trusts for tax reasons decades earlier,164 they were 
often underfunded.  Previously, employees had to hope that the firm 
stayed in business and continued to fund the plan; in other words, 
one of the main risks for employees was whether the firm would 
continue to honor its commitment and avoid going into 
 
 160  Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1253.  Rationally, an employee would only switch 
jobs if the value of another job minus the cost of switching exceeds the value of the 
current one.  Id. at 1254. 
 161  Blair, supra note 125, at 1310. 
 162  Unionization can also be a possible consequence of or reason for firm-specific 
investment, since unions protect employees’ rents and quasi-rents.  Unionization 
rates tend to be higher in manufacturing, where implicit deals with workers and 
specific investment are sometimes thought to be more common.  E.g., Charny, supra 
note 57, at 1625–26. 
 163  29 U.S.C. § 1103 (2006). 
 164  John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of 
Commerce, 107 YALE L. J. 165, 169 (1997).  By contrast, in some European countries 
such as Germany, Spain, Italy, Sweden, and Austria, firms often commit to paying 
retirement benefits directly, and thus need to fund provisions for future payments in 
their balance sheets.  GORDON L. CLARK, PENSION FUND CAPITALISM 59–60 (2000) 
(discussing “book reserve” plans in Germany).  
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bankruptcy.165  Even with the insurance provided by the PBGC today, 
beneficiaries of a DB plan run the risk of losing the uninsured 
portion of the plan when the firm is not financially solvent and the 
plan becomes underfunded (for instance, because of a capital market 
downturn).166  If firms are unable to fill the funding gap at that time, 
employees may lose a portion of their pension.167 
Risks for employees are different in today’s DC world.  On the 
one hand, 401(k) plans are individual accounts that are controlled by 
the beneficiary, who can transfer them to a new employer’s plan or 
shift the assets into an IRA.  This reduces switching costs and the 
degree to which employees are tied to a particular employer.  On the 
other hand, with a DC plan, potential retirees bear the investment 
risk because the employer does not have to jump in if the plan assets 
do not suffice to meet pension obligations. 
The amount of funds available for retirement depends on 
investment success.168  DC plans such as 401(k)s and IRAs (often 
consisting of 401(k) assets rolled over after a job change)169 are 
invested in publicly-traded securities.  The share of investment in 
stocks strongly increased at least between 1989 and 2001, when more 
than half of 401(k) plans reported to invest “mostly in stock.”170  
Consequently, it is important for future retirees that capital 
markets—in particular equity markets—are doing well.  In the bull 
markets of the 1980s and 1990s, and even in the years after the 2002 
financial scandals, many employees did quite well and accumulated a 
significant retirement bonus.  The financial crisis that started in 2008 
showed the downside of the defined contribution society: pension 
assets were flattened, which made it difficult for many to retire as 
planned.171  Thus, in theory, a DC plan should eliminate the 
 
 165  E.g., Friedman, supra note 63, at 220 (noting the risk of employer bankruptcy 
in a defined benefit plan); see also Sass, supra note 58, at 87 (“If the employer went 
bust, so would the benefits of current and future pensioners . . . .”); MACKENZIE, supra 
note 139, at 53. 
 166  Supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 167  Friedman, supra note 63, at 220.  
 168  E.g., MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 68. 
 169  MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 69. 
 170  Andrew A. Samwick & Jonathan Skinner, How Will 401(k) Pension Plans Affect 
Retirement Income?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 329, 333–34 (2004) (reporting an increase of 
investment “mostly in stocks” from 23.69% to 54.54% between 1989 and 2001, and a 
decrease of investment “mostly in bonds” from 39.52% to 10.31%). 
 171  See, e.g., Edward Whitehouse, Anna D’Addio & Andrew Reilly, Investment Risk 
and Pensions: Impact on Individual Retirement Incomes and Government Budgets, OECD 
SOCIAL, EMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION WORKING PAPERS No. 87, 47 (2009) (“Pension 
funds lost 23% of their value in OECD countries in 2008 . . . .”). 
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employee’s risk-bearing with respect to the bankruptcy of the 
employer, since it is not involved in pension payments other than in a 
DB plan.  That, however, assumes that retirement accounts are 
properly diversified.  During the boom years, many firms encouraged 
employees to invest in the firms’ own shares, often in the form of 
ESOPs.  But even normal retirement accounts were often weighed 
heavily in favor of the employer, partly because employers often only 
matched employee contributions that were invested in their own 
stock.  Obviously, putting retirement assets into ESOPs makes 
employees bear the risk of the development of their employers’ stock.  
Excessive investment in company stock has led to disaster for some 
employees in cases such as Enron, where many lost much of their 
retirement savings.172  Of course, stock market downturns also affect 
DB plans; DB plans become less liquid, and it may become harder to 
make pension payments due to liquidity constraints.  In severe cases, 
the sponsoring firm may have to pitch in to close the funding gap.173  
The financial crisis of 2008–2009 has severely impacted the 
remaining DB plans, forcing firms to reduce shareholders’ equity by 
putting funding liabilities on their balance sheets.174 
Thus, the core difference in the employee’s financial position is 
that, in a DC plan, an employee is a shareholder, namely either a 
diversified investor in the capital market or in his own employer 
through an ESOP.  In the case of well-diversified investment, 
employees should no longer have a strong interest in the employer’s 
financial well-being, except to the extent that it protects their human 
capital.175  If the pension plan is heavily invested in the employer, the 
employee becomes a long-term shareholder, strongly dependent on 
the firm’s long-term development. 
By contrast, in a DB plan the position of the employee compares 
to that of a bondholder of the employer, specifically a secured 
bondholder to the extent of the guarantee by the PBGC and that of 
 
 172  See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 113 (providing statistics about cases 
where significant amounts of retirement assets were lost, and discussing Enron in 
more detail); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of 
the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1248–49 
(2002) (describing the retirement problem of Enron employees); Millon, supra note 
90, at 119. 
 173  See OECD, PRIVATE PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2008, 18–19 (2009). 
 174  James J. Hanks, Jr., Legal Capital and the Model Business Corporation Act: An Essay 
for Bayless Manning, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 229–30 (2011). 
 175  The overall well-being of the respective industry should still matter to the 
individual employee, as long as he has industry-specific human capital, and to unions 
hoping to maintain membership. 
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an unsecured bondholder for additional amounts.176  The employee 
depends on the employer to meet his obligations and to continue to 
fund plans, and is subject to the risk of opportunistic benefit cuts.177  
Like a bondholder, employees do not participate in general upswings 
in the economy that elevate values above the promised amount178 and 
are also subject to the risk of inflation.179 
D. Shifting Employee Interests 
Even assuming a constant level of human capital investment 
during the past thirty years, the shift from DB to DC plans must have 
had consequences for what policies are in the interest of employees, 
particularly when shareholder interests and employee interests 
conflict.180  Employees depend less on their employer for their 
financial capital, and more strongly on the capital market.  For many 
families, their 401(k) plans represent the bulk of the available 
financial assets and thus determine financial security in retirement.181  
Capital markets have therefore become very important for the middle 
class. 
The classic shareholder-labor controversy of this type is whether 
managers should be allowed to defend against hostile takeovers.  By 
default, both managers and workers would prefer a “quiet life,” 
meaning an absence of hostile takeovers disrupting their routine and 
putting their jobs at risk.182  A takeover puts employees at risk since it 
often results in significant restructuring of the enterprise, which 
 
 176  Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1258–59; Shigeto Kashiwazaki & Hiroharu 
Fukazawa, Current Situation and Issues of Retirement Benefit (Corporate Pension) in Japan, 7 
JAPAN LAB. REV. 66, 73 (2010) (making the analogous argument for Japan).  Empirical 
evidence shows that shareholders effectively pick up the tab, and that corporate 
equity risk reflects the riskiness of the assets held by a firm’s pension plan.  See Li Jin, 
Robert C. Merton, & Zvi Bodie, Do a firm’s equity returns reflect the risk of its pension 
plan?, 81 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2006). 
 177  Kashiwazaki & Fukazawa, supra note 176, at 73–74.  Note that pension plan 
underfunding undercuts diversification because employees again depend on the 
employer.  See Ippolito, supra note 127, at 1259 (arguing that the underfunding of 
pension plans discourages unions from engaging in holdup to the detriment of 
shareholders); Ippolito, supra note 112, at 611. 
 178  PETER F. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION 94–95 (1976). 
 179  Id. at 96–97; Markus Roth, German Private Pension Law, in IMAGINING THE IDEAL 
PENSION SYSTEM 131, 143 (Dana M. Muir & John A. Turner eds., 2011).  
 180  Arthur R. Pinto, The United States, in PUBLIC COMPANIES AND THE ROLE OF 
SHAREHOLDERS 13, 22–23 (Sabrina Bruno & Eugenio Ruggiero eds., 2011).  
 181  MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 59, at 68–69. 
 182  E.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullianathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life?  
Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1066–67 (2003) 
(suggesting that managers prefer a “quiet life” not involving confrontation with 
labor). 
GELTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/28/2013  1:25 PM 
2013] PENSIONS & SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 945 
often leads to changes to corporate objectives, product lines, 
factories, and thus conditions of work and maybe the downsizing of 
the workforce.  Labor, therefore, typically prefers strong takeover 
defenses.  Shareholders may want managers to defend against hostile 
takeovers to the extent that this drives up the price paid by the 
bidder,183 but they will want a takeover to go forward once managers 
have bargained for a good price with the bidder.184 
The shift in the private pension system has thus influenced the 
effects of different policies on employees.  An employee saving for 
retirement in a DB plan firm needs to care little about how corporate 
law policies affect share values generally, and the value of her 
employer specifically.  Her two objectives—protecting her human 
capital and her pension wealth—can be achieved by largely the same 
means, namely by staying in the firm and hoping for a favorable 
working environment and workplace conditions, for promotion 
opportunities within the firm, and for the firm’s continued operation 
of the pension plan.  The capital market is only important when an 
employer loses its ability to fund the plan.  Even if employees have no 
firm-specific human capital investment, in a traditional DB plan they 
have specific financial capital as de facto bondholders of their firm 
and are thus subject to a possible holdup threat.  Pro-shareholder 
policies that create pressure to cut costs and downsize may not only 
threaten their human capital, but also their financial capital if the 
end result is a reduction of pension benefits, or even the ultimate 
termination of a DB plan following an LBO.185  Pension wealth, 
therefore, will generate little, if any, worker preferences for pro-
shareholder policies at the expense of labor in DB plans.186  Workers 
 
 183  In the debates about Delaware takeover law, managers at least claim that 
bidders offer an inadequate price because the stock market does not fully reflect the 
value and the potential of the firm, and that shareholders are likely to be duped into 
a accepting an inadequate offer.  See, e.g., Allen, Jacobs, & Strine, supra note 52, at 
1091 (“The first argument is that stockholders with diversified portfolios will be 
better served if informed directors are permitted to block business combinations that 
they believe in good faith are ill-advised.”). 
 184  This is the rationale for so-called Revlon duties, according to which the board 
of directors is required to maximize price once a sale of the company has become 
inevitable.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 
(Del. 1986). 
 185  For a discussion of opportunistic terminations, see supra Part III.B.4. 
 186  Peter Drucker coined the term “pension fund socialism” in a 1976 book and 
argued that employees already owned American business through DB plans.  But he 
acknowledged that, psychologically, employees neither knew that they were owners 
nor perceived or experienced ownership.  DRUCKER, supra note 178, at 97.  The 
reason is that employees in DB plans are better characterized as creditors than as 
owners.  See also Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on 
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will strongly prefer policies that result in a stable labor environment 
and will disfavor pro-shareholder policies that are antagonistic to that 
result. While they may care about the governance and efficiency of 
the firm to the extent needed to achieve these goals, they will likely 
disfavor risk-taking because of their large idiosyncratic risk in the 
firm. 
In a DC plan, pro-shareholder policies will have a direct impact 
on employee wealth that may change whether a particular policy is 
beneficial or detrimental to employees.  For example, a proposed 
policy that facilitates hostile takeovers may reduce the value of 
human capital, while at the same time increase the value of pension 
wealth.  That does not imply that workers no longer need to care 
about their jobs.  Even if there is no specific human capital, workers 
bear a “switching cost” and often have to accept less well-paying jobs.  
On the margin, however, the closer connection between share value 
and pension wealth in DC plans implies that the benefits of pro-
shareholder corporate policies are greater than in DB plans, thus 
making these relatively more advantageous compared to pro-labor 
policies.187 
E. Shareholder Primacy and Social Welfare 
Weighing the pro-shareholder and pro-labor policy objectives 
against each other, an overall social welfare analysis will most likely 
come to a different conclusion in the corporate DB world of the 
1970s, as compared to the DC world of today.  In a hypothetical 
society where nine out of ten employees are subject to a DB plan and 
one is subject to a DC plan, the larger number of workers is more 
likely to benefit from pro-labor policies that generally protect human 
capital, as opposed to pro-shareholder policies that benefit DC 
pension wealth and have little impact on DB pension wealth.  If the 
numbers are reversed, a redistributive policy change that benefits 
shareholders at the expense of employees may hurt human capital to 
some extent, but for many employees, this will be outweighed by 
benefits to DC pension wealth, while the impact on DB pension 
wealth will be smaller. 
A well-meaning social planner would therefore very likely favor a 
different corporate law policy.  Leaving other possible effects of the 
 
Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 567–68 (1981) (predicting a 
growing influence of pension fund administrators). 
 187  While an ESOP would seem to make workers prefer less risky corporate 
decisions given their non-diversified portfolio, a generous takeover premium might 
sometimes help to overcome worker resistance. 
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change aside, the optimal point in a shareholder-labor scale will shift 
closer to full shareholder primacy in a world where DC plans 
dominate.  The shift to greater shareholder primacy since the 1970s 
may reflect the fact that the effects of pro-shareholder policies on 
employees have become relatively more beneficial.188 
The analysis so far has assumed that the extent of human capital 
investment has remained constant and that it is also unchanged in its 
degree of specificity, the conclusion being that it is desirable for the 
balance to shift to some extent in favor of investor interests.  But to 
optimize policy choices, one would need to determine the relative 
significance of firm-specific human capital and pension wealth.  
Margaret Blair estimates that the value of specific human capital is 
typically several times as large as pension wealth.189 
Apart from that, the transformation of pension wealth may have 
affected incentives to invest in specific human capital.  The growth of 
DC plans coincided and maybe was partly a consequence of the 
decline of “large hierarchic firms and unionized industries,” and the 
simultaneous growth of “high-tech firms and small, non-unionized 
companies.”190  Relatedly, labor mobility began to increase in the late 
1960s.191  Thus, firm-specific human capital may have become less 
important in the U.S. economy during the past decades. 
The increase in labor mobility, which was influenced by a variety 
of economic, social, and technological factors, started earlier than 
the change in the pension system.  Industries preferring DB plans 
likely declined for other reasons, while other industries prospered.192  
Traditional DB plans, however, were suited to industries with a stable 
workforce and not those in which workers tend to switch jobs 
 
 188  Changes in the pension system may have contributed to the popularity of 
shareholder primacy in academia.  As a business school professor put it at a 
conference on shareholder primacy: “The closer I get to retirement, the more I like 
shareholder wealth maximization.”  This tongue-in-cheek remark reflects that with 
increasing age, human capital (understood as net present value of future earnings) 
decreases, while pension wealth (net present value of pensions) increases. 
 189  Blair, supra note 125, at 1310.  
 190  Munnell, supra note 60, at 367; see also Gustman & Steinmeier, supra note 119. 
 191  E.g., Gueorgui Kambourov & Iourii Manovskii, Rising Occupational and Industry 
Mobility in the United States: 1968–1997, 49 INT’L ECON. REV 41 (2008) (describing an 
increase in mobility both between jobs and between different industries). 
 192  Different levels of investment in human capital may be optimal in different 
industries, and it may even be possible to organize work in ways that require different 
levels of firm-specific human capital within a specific industry.  See, e.g., MARGARET M. 
BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 263–66 (1995) (discussing differences in worker mobility and 
wage premia for incumbents between industries). 
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frequently in the course of their careers.193  Since ERISA made it 
more difficult to inhibit mobility, it may have made the former 
industries relatively less competitive.  Thus, it probably accelerated 
the trend toward more mobility, less firm-specific human capital, and 
possibly more general or industry-specific human capital.194  The 
regulatory changes of the 1970s further helped the transformation of 
the American economy. 
Note that the point on social welfare is one of relative efficiency 
of shareholder orientation given specific circumstances.  The overall 
effects of the change are more complex and probably indeterminate: 
on the one hand, the reduction of firm-specific investment may have 
hurt the American economy, and DC plans may harm workers by 
burdening them with investment risk they are not well suited to bear.  
DC funds are also sometimes thought to have a shorter time horizon 
than DB funds and may therefore make it harder for firms to pursue 
long-term projects.195  On the other hand, the shift to DC plans may 
also have reduced employee resistance against innovation and 
changes in the work environment.  Larger financial markets may have 
encouraged economic growth. 
V. THE CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
This Part explores the consequences for the interest group 
politics of corporate governance.  Parts V.A and V.B consider the 
general political environment and suggest that changes in the 
pension system helped to align the interests of workers with those of 
shareholders, thus leading to the rise of the “transparency coalition” 
identified by political scientists.  Parts V.C, V.D, and V.E provide an 
illustration of this seismic shift in the politics of corporate governance 
by looking at the rise of shareholder activism during the same period.  
A significant contribution to shareholder activism came from unions, 
which embraced the newly found “capitalist” interest of workers as 
equity investors, and thus began to promote shareholder wealth 
maximization as one of their policy objectives.  The shift from DB to 
DC plans was very likely not the only factor; indeed, some of the most 
important shareholder activists are public pension plans operating 
 
 193  Munnell, supra note 60, at 367. 
 194  See Jacoby, supra note 19, at 286 (suggesting that firms no longer invest in 
long-term projects such as employee training due to the short-term horizon of 
institutional investors). 
 195  E.g., Michel Goyer, Capital Mobility, Varieties of Institutional Investors, and the 
Transforming Stability of Corporate Governance in France and Germany, in BEYOND 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 195, 203 (Bob Hancké, Martin Rhodes, & Mark Thatcher 
eds., 2007). 
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under a DB system, who also became more strongly involved in equity 
markets due to regulatory changes.  The objective is to show that the 
implementation of pro-shareholder reforms is partly the unintended 
consequence of changes in the pension sector that made the 
proposition of shareholder primacy more attractive. 
A. Shareholders and the Center-Left 
The increased importance of pension wealth for the welfare and 
security of individuals also had an impact on the politics of corporate 
governance.  With the middle class increasingly depending on 
pension savings, shareholders have become an important political 
constituency.196  Shareholders are sometimes even thought of “as a 
proxy for the median voter.”197  Consequently, the political center-left 
has championed the cause of shareholders, since an anti-
management agenda resonates with members of the middle class, 
who are often both shareholders and employees.198  Pro-shareholder 
reforms of the past twenty years tended to be endorsed by the 
Democratic Party and opposed by the Republicans, who were often in 
favor of reforms that sought to cabin allegedly excessive litigation.199  
This is most clear in the context of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which reacted to the corporate 
governance crises of Enron and the Great Recession respectively200: 
democrats supported reforms that provided stronger securities 
regulation, “Say on Pay” and “Proxy Access,” whereas Republicans, 
alongside lobbyists such as the Business Roundtable and the 
Chamber of Commerce, generally aligned themselves with critics who 
argued that overregulation was liable to stifle the economy.  Some of 
the initiatives that led to the most recent reforms, such as the 2009 
proposal for a Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, clearly established a 
connection between corporate governance failures and “losses that 
have been borne by millions of Americans who are shareholders 
through their pension plans, 401(k) plans, and direct 
 
 196  Davis, supra note 14, at 1129 (suggesting the increasing political importance of 
shareholder value due to the increase in the number of households invested in the 
stock market from 20% in 1983 to 50% in 2001). 
 197  William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the 
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 81, 139 (2011). 
 198  Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 309, 338 (2011). 
 199  See John W. Cioffi & Martin Höpner, The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: 
Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform, 34 POL. 
& SOC’Y 463, 480–84 (2006). 
 200  JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER 108–36 (2010).  
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investments[.]”201  One of the most telling examples in which the pro-
shareholders forces were not successful is the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which was intended to curtail 
securities litigation and was enacted by a Republican Congress over 
President Clinton’s veto.202 
B. The “Transparency Coalition” and Its Effects 
The major corporate governance reforms of the last two decades 
have primarily affected securities law and have sought to make 
management more transparent and more accountable to the 
investing public.  The dividing line on these policy issues tended to 
run between management and all other groups in corporate 
governance.  In situations like this, it is comparatively easy for what 
Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn have christened the “transparency 
coalition” to dominate corporate law policymaking.  In such a 
situation, managers have to yield to the demands of investors and 
workers on the political level, both of whom benefit from 
transparency.203 
Not all corporate governance issues lend themselves to a 
shareholder-worker coalition, however.  In contrast to the shared 
interest in transparency, employees may be more skeptical about 
increasing the actual decision-making power of shareholders, 
particularly in decisions with redistributive effects between capital 
and labor.  Some hostile takeovers likely entailed such conflicts.  In 
Delaware, where takeover law took shape in the case law in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, managers retained their preeminence as the leading 
interest group to shape the law on takeover defenses, without having 
to enter into coalitions.  In most cases, managers of companies 
threatened by hostile takeovers were the prime sponsors of anti-
 
 201  Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, S.1074, 111th Cong. § 2(3) (2009); see also 
Bruner, supra note 198, at 337–38 (citing from the bill and describing the Obama 
administration’s agenda to help the middle class). 
 202  CIOFFI, supra note 200, at 105–07.  It is certainly not a new development for the 
Democratic Party to side with investors against managers.  As John W. Cioffi  and 
Martin Höpner point out, “the New Deal of the 1930s created modern securities 
regulation.”  Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 199, at 484.  Adolf Berle advocated 
shareholder primacy and was an advisor to President Roosevelt.  William W. Bratton 
& Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and the 
Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 114–18 (2008).  William W. Bratton and 
Michael L. Wachter document that Berle’s erstwhile opponent E. Merrick Dodd 
associated himself with representatives of managers who saw planning by the 
managerial elite as the way out of the incipient Great Depression.  Id. at 123–24. 
 203  GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 22, at 210–11. 
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takeover statutes,204 but they often received passive or active support 
from unions.205  In some cases, legislation supported solely by 
managers would have been unlikely to pass without the endorsement 
of a traditional Democratic constituency such as labor.206 
Takeovers, however, are no longer as politically salient as they 
were in the 1980s.  During that period, DC plans had only begun to 
supplant DB plans; thus, political decisions on state takeover law 
might actually come out differently in today’s environment.  The 
corporate governance reforms and reform projects of the past two 
decades were intended to make managers more accountable to 
shareholders.  Putting independent directors in charge of the board’s 
audit committee,207 strengthening auditor independence,208 
strengthening shareholder voice in director appointments,209 and “Say 
on Pay”210 would at first glance not seem to have colorable 
detrimental consequences for employees. 
But it is sometimes thought that in the managerial model of the 
1950s, employees tacitly or explicitly formed coalitions with 
management to the detriment of outside shareholders;211 in this view, 
management agreed to generous deals regarding wages and benefits 
for employees, while unions would not object to “sweet deals” or 
private benefits of control for top management.  Obviously, reforms 
increasing transparency and strengthening shareholder voice may be 
making this kind of deal more difficult.  Conceivably, in a stakeholder 
model of corporate governance, corporate opacity might make it 
 
 204  See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 
749–51 (1998) (listing corporate sponsors of statutes). 
 205  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on 
Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435, 437 n.8 (1988); Eric W. 
Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 14, 24–25 (1992); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 10, 63–64 (1991); Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: 
Hollow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 96 (1999). 
 206  See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile Takeover and the Role of 
the States, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 491, 496–97 (1988). 
 207  Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 775 (2002). 
 208  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Title II, 116 Stat. at 771–75. 
 209  Regarding the SEC’s efforts to expand “shareholder access” to the company’s 
proxy statement, see supra note 21. 
 210  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 951, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899 (2010) (introducing a new Securities Exchange Act 
§ 14A, which requires shareholder votes on executive compensation).  On the 
preceding discussion, see, Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. 
Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-in, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323 (2009).  
 211  E.g., Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Governance 
Structure, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 97, 101 (2000); GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 
22, at 237–38; GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 14, at 99–135. 
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easier to engage in long-run deals with labor that would be assessed 
very critically under the short-term pressures emanating from the 
capital markets.212  In a less transparent corporate world where 
managers are less exposed to pressures from the capital markets, it 
may be easier to implement pension plans, whose conceivable 
benefits for human capital213 are hard to assess for the financial 
market.214  The bottom line is that changes in corporate governance 
that result in increased transparency could be a factor associated with 
both the shift toward DC plans and the increasing dominance of 
shareholder over labor interests. 
C. The Rise of Institutional Investors 
The changes in the private pension landscape have also had the 
effect of channeling the political power of shareholder value through 
the pension system,215 thus increasing the significance of the financial 
industry, both on the level of individual firms where pension wealth is 
invested and on the political level.  Due to institutional constraints, 
the effects on the politics are more nuanced than one might expect. 
There are several models of how pension wealth is managed.  
Their structure is determined by the Taft-Hartley Act, which allows 
employer-provided pension plans to have at most 50% union 
representatives on their board of trustees.216  Thus, pension plans are 
 
 212  Institutional investors in general and pension funds in particular are often 
criticized for their short-term orientation.  E.g., Jacoby, supra note 19, at 285.  
Relatedly, the argument that hostile takeovers maximize shareholder wealth rests on 
the assumption that market values reflect long-term firm value with reasonable 
accuracy.  See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder 
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 674 (2007) (“academic endorsement of . . . short-term 
stock price . . . may reinforce inappropriate managerial decisions); Michael L. 
Wachter, Takeover Defenses When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient, 151 U. 
PA. L. REV. 787, 819–23 (2003). 
 213  See supra Parts III.B.3, IV.B, and IV.C. 
 214  Furthermore, with the rise of the DC paradigm, DB pension plans are 
becoming less familiar to shareholders, to whom they may appear as an unjustified 
privilege of unionized workers.  Compare the debate about pension benefits of 
public employees.  Move Public Employees Into 401(k)s?: Room for Debate, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/02/27/why-not-
401ks-for-public-employees. 
 215  Tom Hadden, Corporate Governance by Institutional Investors?  Some Problems from 
the International Perspective, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
89, 94 (Theodor Baums, Richard M. Buxbaum, & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 1993) (stating 
that pension fund managers are only interested in shareholder wealth). 
 216  The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 prohibits employers from making payments to 
unions, including union-run pension funds, except plans with equal representation 
of employees and employers (i.e., unions and managers) on the board.  Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).  The 
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controlled either by corporate managers or under shared control by 
employers and unions.  Employer-pension plans obviously do not 
appear as separate actors in corporate governance.217  Plans under 
shared management—so-called Taft-Hartley plans—are usually multi-
employer plans and therefore dominated by unions, which are 
independent corporate governance players.  By contrast, 401(k) 
assets are typically invested in mutual funds. 
Consider the Conference Board’s data on equity ownership in 




Act was part of the backlash to the New Deal, when managers feared increased union 
influence and induced Congress to pass the Act prohibiting payments to plans that 
were fully controlled by unions, which unions might have used to fund strikes or 
activity directing against employers.  See Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Pensions, 41 UCLA L. REV. 75, 84–85 (1993) (discussing interest groups in the 
legislative process); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate 
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1075–77 (1998) 
(describing the origin, structure, and prevalence of Taft-Hartley Plans); Murphy, 
supra note 108, at 531–32.  ERISA applies to both corporate pension plans and Taft-
Hartley plans, which are often multi-employer plans and are typically dominated by 
unions.  See Marleen O’Connor, Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building 
Coalitions to Promote Worker Welfare, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1345, 1357 (1997).  Pension 
plans directly controlled by employers do not engage in shareholder activism.  Roe, 
supra, note 215, at 109. 
 217  Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 596–98 
(1990); Roe, supra note 216, at 109 (“ERISA rules and pension structure help protect 
managers form intrusive shareholders”); Murphy, supra note 108, at 525–29. 
 218  MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE 2010 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO 
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Figure 5: Investment in equities (billions of $)
Private pension funds State and local pension funds
Investment companies Total institutional investment
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Figure 5 illustrates the growth of institutional investment from 1980 
through 2009.  Total institutional investment increased from $436.2 
billion in 1980 to $13,473 billion in 2007, just before the financial 
crisis.  These figures of course do not only include vehicles for 
pension wealth,219 and not all investment company assets are pension 
assets (although a large part is). 
 
 
Figure 6220 shows that the share of institutional investors in equity 
investment also increased relatively, namely from less than 30% to 
around 50%.  Private and public pension funds initially grew from a 
share of about 17% and 3% respectively (relative to total equity 
investment).  After 1990, private funds began to lose market share, 
while public finds largely maintained theirs, with private funds 
showing up with 14.7% in 2007 and public ones with 7.8% in the 
same year.  Meanwhile, investment companies’ share increased from 
only 3.1% in 1980 to 22% in 2007.  Overall, the total share of these 
three types of investment vehicles grew from 23% to 42.5% of the 
equities market. 
D. Unions as Corporate Governance Activists 
The newfound significance of capital markets for workers was of 
course not lost on unions, which began to use their power for the 
 
 219  Insurance companies, savings institutions, and foundations are omitted from 
Figures 5 and 6. 
 220  Data from TONELLO & RABIMOV, supra note 218 (obvious mathematical error 









Figure 6: Institutional share of equity investment
Private pension funds State and local pension funds
Investment companies Total institutional investment
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benefit of their constituents.  Unions no longer only engage in 
classical industrial action, but have also become some of the most 
visible shareholder activists,221 both through Taft-Hartley pension 
plans and through their own holdings.222  Some unions, such as AFL-
CIO and the Teamsters, were parties in notable corporate law cases 
relating to shareholder voting, some of which ostensibly had nothing 
to do with labor issues.223  Furthermore, in the early 1990s, unions 
switched alliances with respect to takeovers: instead of siding with 
managers to oppose them,224 they began to join forces with other 
shareholders to obtain the highest return on their investment.225  
Unions have supported corporate governance legislation intended to 
hold managers more accountable to shareholders, including 
Sarbanes-Oxley226 and shareholder proxy access.227  They generally 
support pro-shareholder institutions such as the Council of 
Institutional Investors and the International Corporate Governance 
Network.228 
 
 221  E.g., Marleen O’Connor, Labor’s Role in the Shareholder Revolution, in WORKING 
CAPITAL: THE POWER OF LABOR’S PENSIONS 67, 67 (Archon Fung, Tessa Hebb & Joel 
Rogers eds., 2001).  Shareholder activism is often part of a so-called “comprehensive 
campaign,” in the course of which unions employ all available tactics against a firm, 
including public relations and legislative initiatives.  James J. Brudney, Collateral 
Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 731, 738 (2010). 
 222  See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 216, at 1081 (pointing out that unions are 
not subject to ERISA fiduciary duties with their own holdings). 
 223  E.g., Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); The Food and Allied Serv. Trade Dep’t v. Wal-
Mart, No. Civ. A. 12551, 1992 WL 111285 (Del. Ch. Ct. May 20, 1992) (seeking a 
stock list to inform shareholders about the use of prison labor); Int’l Brotherhood of 
Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Co., Inc., 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999) (finding that 
shareholders may propose and adopt a bylaw requiring the redemption of a poison 
pill).  See also AFSCME v. AIG, 462 F.3d 121 (2nd Cir. 2006) (public sector union 
seeking bylaw amendment to allow shareholder proxy access); CA Inc. v. AFSCME 
Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (public-sector union seeking a bylaw 
amendment requiring the reimbursement of shareholders for expenses relating to 
contested director elections). 
 224  E.g., Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor be Allowed to Make 
Shareholder Proposals, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 47 (1998). 
 225  O’Connor, supra note 211, at 101, 109–10; see Thomas & Martin, supra note 
224, at 48–51 (describing the historical development of union activism). 
 226  See Sanford M. Jacoby, Finance and Labor: Perspectives on Risk, Inequality, and 
Democracy, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 17, 51–52 (2008) (describing the AFL-CIO’s 
support for Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 227  See  id. at 55–56 (discussing union support for shareholder proxy access); 
Sanford M. Jacoby, The Future of Labor and Finance, 30 COMP LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 111, 116 
(2008). 
 228  Brishen Rogers, The Complexities of Shareholder Primacy: A Response to Sanford 
Jacoby, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 95, 98–99 (2008). 
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Part of this may be attributable to highly contextualized 
decisions to engage in shareholder activism and the fragmented 
character of the American labor movement: unions have little reason 
to care about workers in other firms who are not their members.  A 
single national union might have reacted differently.  Nevertheless, it 
seems paradoxical for unions, whose purpose is to represent 
employees, to support hostile takeovers and other business measures 
that may entail downsizing and job cuts.229  Their changed focus looks 
justified, however, when one realizes that unions have been operating 
under very different circumstances in recent decades: membership 
decreased dramatically during the 1980s.230  While unions certainly 
continued to have an interest in preserving jobs in order to maintain 
their membership, because of aging cohorts of workers retiring, a 
larger percentage of their constituents were pensioners.  
Consequently, obtaining a good return on their investments for aging 
members became relatively more important.231  In addition, ERISA 
may also have played a role in instigating union shareholder activism, 
given that the pension plan’s board members were subject to the 
statute’s fiduciary duty.232 
The view of unions as true shareholder activists has of course 
been challenged.  In the popular press, it has sometimes been 
suggested that unions use their influence as shareholders to advance 
a general political agenda.233  In the more nuanced academic 
 
 229  Simon Deakin, The Rise of Finance: What Is It, What Is Driving It, What Might Stop 
It?, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 67, 71 (2008); see also Teresa Ghilarducci, Solving the 
Paradox of Workers as Shareholders: A Comment on Sanford Jacoby, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 85, 88 (2008) (ironically suggesting that unions are funding their “class 
enemies”). 
 230  O’Connor, supra note 211, at 101; O’Connor, supra note 216, at 1379; 
Wachter, supra note 118, at 582, 634 (plotting the percentage of union workers 1930–
2005); Murphy, supra note 108, at 532 (describing a decline in union membership 
from 30% to 9% between the 1950s and 2000).  Takeovers in which unionized 
employees were laid off seem to have been one of the reasons.  Thomas & Martin, 
supra note 224, at 41, 47–48. 
 231  See Thomas & Martin, supra note 224, at 49 (describing the new-found union 
opposition to takeover defenses); Teresa Ghilarducci, James Hawley & Andrew 
William, Labour’s Paradoxical Interest and the Evolution of Corporate Governance, 24 J. L. & 
SOC’Y 26, 34 (1997).  The success of “comprehensive campaigns” by unions that 
include shareholder activism has apparently also contributed to growth in union 
membership since 2005, particularly in the services industries.  Brudney, supra note 
221, at 742.  
 232  Schwab & Thomas, supra note 216, at 1077–78; O’Connor, supra note 211, at 
129–30; see also Rogers, supra note 228, at 107 (suggesting that the ERISA trustee duty 
would weigh against union use of shareholder activism for other ends than wealth 
maximization). 
 233  E.g., Pension Fund Blackmail, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2005, at A10 (accusing the 
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discussion, critics such as Reinier Kraakman suggested that unions 
are likely to prioritize workers’ interests over shareholder wealth, 
given that the former are tied up in a specific firm.  Thus, labor can 
capture rents in the guise of wages; by contrast, the pension 
investment in shares is spread out over a diversified portfolio and 
thus hard to influence through activism.234  But an empirical study by 
Schwab and Thomas found that union activism more often than not 
works in favor of shareholder wealth.235  While the anecdotal and 
empirical picture is certainly ambiguous, both public and private 
sector unions have initiated and supported measures that are 
generally thought to be in the interest of shareholders.  These 
include pro-takeover initiatives such as pill-redemption bylaws, 
staggered boards,236 and bylaw amendments relating to shareholder 
voting, such as the contested issue of majority voting instead of 
plurality voting in elections for directors.237  There were also some 
widely publicized cases where unions pushed “corporate social 
 
AFL-CIO of influencing managers to oppose private social security accounts). 
 234  Reinier Kraakman, The Mystery of Union Shareholder Activism: Commentary on 
Schwab and Thomas, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: 
ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 431, 433–34 (Samuel 
Estreicher ed., 1998).  To protect workers from excessive risk, diversification is 
mandated by section 404 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C)), which may inhibit 
private pension fund activism.  See Murphy, supra note 108, at 506–07. 
 235  Schwab & Thomas, supra note 216, at 1090 (summarizing their finding that 
unions have become “sophisticated players in corporate-governance battles,” where 
the “battles emphasize efficiency and firm value”); see also GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra 
note 22, at 251 (identifying “an emerging tendency for workers to make common 
cause with shareholders”); see also Murphy, supra note 108, at 539. 
 236  E.g., UNITE v. May Dept. Stores Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos., 975 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1999); see Schwab 
& Thomas, supra note 216, at 1045 (“The most frequent proposals in the 1995 and 
1996 proxy seasons were those to redeem or vote on poison pills and to repeal 
classified boards . . . .”). 
 237  See, e.g., SEC No-action letter to Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc. (Mar. 30, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2011/unite 
here033011-14a8.pdf (addressing UNITE’s 14a-8 majority voting proposal); SEC No-
action letter to NRG Energy, Incl. (Jan. 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2009/liuna012809-14a8 
.pdf (discussing LIUNA’s majority vote proposal); SEC No-action letter to Suntrust 
Banks (Jan. 13, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-
noaction/14a-8/2010/unitedbrotherhood011510-14a-8.pdf (addressing the United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters’s 14a-8 proposal); WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN 
& GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 214–17 (3d ed. 2009) (example of pension fund using 14a- to 
introduce majority voting); SEC No-action letter to Verizon Communications (Feb. 2, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2009 
/ibew020209-14a8.pdf (discussing private sector union proposal to introduce 
cumulative voting). 
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responsibility” proposals or labor issues.238  Still, even without a full 
empirical assessment, it seems fair to say that union activism has to a 
large degree helped the cause of shareholder primacy.  As early as 
1994, other shareholders trusted unions enough for the evidence to 
show that union proposals received more votes than others.239  This is 
a significant change compared to union activities a few decades 
earlier. 
E. Activism by Other Institutional Investors 
One might object that union-sponsored plans have traditionally 
been DB plans.  But union-sponsored plans are increasingly 
becoming DC plans.  Because the influence of share value on pension 
wealth has increased, unions are more likely to support shareholder-
wealth-oriented proposals..240  Generally, however, public pension 
funds have been much more active shareholders, most notably the 
biggest pension fund in the country, CalPERS.241  While government 
employees typically enjoy DB plans, the fiduciary requirement and 
the increased difficulty in securing state money to cover funding gaps 
may have incited them to promote shareholder wealth.  Before 1980, 
very little public pension money was invested in equities because state 
pension systems were typically not permitted to invest a large 
proportion of their portfolio in shares.242  Until a 1984 amendment to 
the California constitution, CalPERS could only invest up to 25% of 
 
 238  Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 54 
F.3d 69 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995) (14a-8 proposal relating to Wal-Mart’s allegedly 
discriminatory policies); see O’Connor, supra note 221, at 71–73; O’Connor, supra 
note 211, at 113–15 (surveying union use of shareholder proposals in the context of 
labor disputes or negotiations); see also United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Int’l 
Paper Co., 1992, 801 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (union activism relating to 
environmental policies); O’Connor, supra note 216, at 1363–66 (describing the 
controversy about alleged employment discrimination at Cracker Barrel); Anabtawi, 
supra note 21, at 590 (describing United Food Worker’s Union use of pension 
holdings to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis Safeway). 
 239  Thomas & Martin, supra note 224, at 67–68; Schwab & Thomas, supra note 
216, at 1052. 
 240  Schwab & Thomas, supra note 216, at 1040. 
 241  E.g., Sanford M. Jacoby, Convergence by Design: The Case of CalPERS in Japan, 55 
AM. J. COMP. L. 239, 243–54 (2007) (describing the history of shareholder activism by 
CalPERS); Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fish, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the 
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 
315 (2008); Aaron Lucchetti & Joann S. Lublin, Corporate Governance: Calpers Targets 
Directors Who Neglect Holders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2004, at C1 (describing CalPERS’s 
renewed efforts at shareholder activism); see also Westland Police & Fire Retirement 
Sys. v. Axcelis Techs. Inc., 1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010) (public sector pension plan seeking 
to put a majority voting bylaw amendment on the target company’s proxy statement). 
 242  Jacoby, supra note 226, at 46. 
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its portfolio in stocks.243  For similar regulatory reasons, many pension 
funds had few or no equities in their portfolios until the mid-1990s.244  
The proponents of the Californian amendment argued that prudent 
equity investment would create a higher yield and thus save taxpayers 
money.245  With regulation receding and equities increasingly 
perceived as the highest-yielding class of investment, pension funds 
across the country shifted into equities.246  In other words, the equity-
based model penetrated the public sector because private pension 
funds displayed better performance.247  Ultimately, the success of the 
private DC model may therefore have contributed to changing 
practices in the public sector. 
Nevertheless, it is not surprising that state and local government 
pension funds are among the most active institutional investors.248  
One reason may be that some of them are unusually large, and 
another that they comprise about 40% of the pension sector.249  
Having to accommodate demographic challenges and funding gaps, 
public pension funds largely embraced the idea of shareholder 
primacy.250  Large pension funds are likely to be more active because 
they have more predictable inflows and outflows, and because their 
 
 243  CAL. CONST. art. 16, § 17 (amended 1984); CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, 
Primary Election, June 5, 1984, Proposition 21 (proposition to amend the California 
constitution to allow state pension plans to eliminate the 25% ceiling in order to 
allow higher investment returns).  CalPERS had been required to invest only in long-
term bonds that matched its payment obligations, but was permitted to invest 25% of 
its portfolio in stocks in 1967.  See Bruce E. Aronson, A Japanese CalPERS or a New 
Model for Institutional Investor Activism? Japan’s Pension Fund Association and the 
Emergence of Shareholder Activism in Japan, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 571, 593 n.55 (2011).  
The ceiling was eliminated in 1984.  See id.  
 244  David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pension Assets: Empirical Evidence on 
the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 194 (2005).  
In Minnesota and New York, public pension plans were permitted to invest in 
equities in 1995 and 1996 respectively.  Compare  1994 MINN. CHAPTER LAW 604, 
§ 356A.06, subd. 7(f) (permitting investment into equities of up to 85% of plan 
funds), with 1989 MINN. SESS. LAW SERV. 319, § 6, subd. 6(B) (not listing corporate 
stock among permissible investment vehicles). 1996 SESS. LAW NEWS OF N.Y. CH. 712 
(A. 11226).  Compare NY RETIREMENT & SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (1996) § 177(2) 
(permitting at most 2% of fund assets being invested in equities), with NY 
RETIREMENT & SOCIAL SECURITY LAW (1997) § 177(2) (permitting 60%). 
 245  CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 243, at 26, 27. 
 246  CLARK, supra note 164, at 65 (explaining that equities became attractive in bull 
markets). 
 247  Hess, supra note 244, at 194. 
 248  E.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in 
the United States, J. APP. CORP. FIN. , vol. 19, no. 1, at 55, 56–58 (2007) (discussing the 
role of public pension funds). 
 249  Black, supra note 217, at 598–99; Anabtawi, supra note 21, at 588. 
 250  Jacoby, supra note 226, at 46. 
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portfolios inevitably mirror the economy as a whole, thus eliminating 
the exit option.251  Like unions, they also have other controversial 
political and social goals, given that they must appeal to their political 
constituents.252  Generally, however, public pension funds look to the 
“shareholder wealth bottom line” when acting as shareholder 
activists.253  Taking into account that the public sector clients of public 
pension plans never worked at the companies in which their 
retirement savings were invested, it has apparently been easy for 
public pension plans to favor shareholder interests over labor 
interests; public pension fund activism has often led to layoffs and 
divestitures.254 
The spread of 401(k) plans contributed to the enormous 
expansion of the mutual fund industry, in which much of these 
savings are invested.255  Interestingly, mutual funds have embraced 
shareholder activism comparatively late and have been described as 
“relatively docile shareholders” because they rarely engage in 
activism.256  They have often been described as “vot[ing] with their 
feet” by selling if they are discontent with management.257  Moreover, 
some observers have criticized possible conflicts of interest of mutual 
fund managers.  Arguably, fund managers are sometimes inclined to 
 
 251  BLAIR, supra note 192, at 167–68. 
 252  Black, supra note 217, at 599–600 (pointing out that some public pension fund 
managers have to face elections); see Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2491, 2524–25 (2005) (giving an account of CalPERS’ tendency to get involved in 
labor disputes and CSR issues); Hess, supra note 244, at 206 (discussing criticism of 
CalPERS’ activism). 
 253  See Ghilarducci et al., supra note 231, at 30 (reporting that CalPERS targeted 
firms because of poor performance). 
 254  Jacoby, supra note 226, at 47 (quoting a CalPERS official commenting that 
some firms may need to lay off more employees); see O’Connor, supra note 211, at 
110 (describing criticism that pension fund managers are driving downsizing). 
 255  Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisors to 
Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 848, 858 (2009); Murphy, supra note 
108, at 544–45; see David J. Carter, Mutual Fund Boards and Shareholder Action, 3 VILL. J. 
L. & INV. MGMT. 6, 19, 22 (2001) (summarizing data about 401(k) investment in 
mutual funds); Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why not 
disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1426, 1428 (2002) (providing data about the 
growth of the mutual fund industry).  
 256  Leo E. Strine, The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New 
Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 687 (2005); see also Palmiter, 
supra note 256, at 1430–31; Jacoby, supra note 226, at 55; Anne Tucker, The Citizen 
Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to Reflect How and Why a Majority of 
Americans Invest in the Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299, 1302–07 (2012) 
(highlighting agency problems between investors and mutual funds managers). 
 257  E.g., Daniel Gross, Some Mutual Funds Are Joining the Activist Bandwagon, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/business 
/mutfund/15active.html (quoting an investment analyst).  
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please corporate managers, who are in the position to direct 
employees’ 401(k) wealth to investment companies that do not object 
to the firm’s corporate governance practices.258  There is some 
evidence that business ties make mutual funds vote in a more 
manager-friendly way, but the data are not entirely unambiguous.259  
Counterintuitively, Cremers and Romano found that even a 2003 SEC 
rule requiring disclosure of voting decisions has led not to more pro-
shareholder votes by mutual funds, but rather to an increased 
support of executive compensation plans proposed by 
management.260 
Scholars have advanced several explanations for the failure of 
401(k) plans to produce the level of shareholder activism that would 
seem optimal from the perspective of investors: first, mutual funds 
make money through the fees they charge investors,261 and the funds 
tend to be strongly diversified, so that benefits from shareholder 
 
 258  Palmiter, supra note 256, at 1432; Jacoby, supra note 226, at 55; Murphy, supra 
note 108, at 560; see Black, supra note 217, at 602 (“(i) mutual funds often invest 
401(k) and defined contribution pension plan funds for corporations, and thus face 
some of the same pressures as other corporate pension fund managers”); Roger W. 
Ferguson, Riding Herd on Company Management, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2010, at A15 
(President of TIAA-CREF pointing out mutual funds managers’ possible conflicts of 
interest). 
 259  Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual Funds, 
85 J. FIN. ECON. 552 (2007) (finding no relationship between business ties and voting 
patterns on the firm level, but an aggregate propensity of mutual fund families with 
more business ties to vote in favor of management); Taub, supra note 255, at 875–76 
(finding that mutual funds were less likely to vote in favor of shareholder proposals 
when the same mutual fund family also managed the company’s 401(k) plan).  For 
data on mutual fund proxy voting, see also Burton Rothberg & Steven Lilien, Mutual 
Funds and Proxy Voting: New Evidence on Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 157 
(2006); Rasha Ashraf, Narayanan Jayaraman &  Harley E. Ryan, Jr., Do Pension-Related 
Business Ties Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on 
Executive Compensation, 47 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 567 (2012) (finding that funds with 
pension-related business ties are more likely to vote in favor of managers, irrespective 
of ties with the specific firm). 
 260  K.J. Martijn Cremers & Roberta Romano, Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting 
on Compensation Plans: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund Voting Disclosure Rules, 13 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 220 (2011); see Proxy Voting by Investment Companies, Securities 
Act Release, No. 8188, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), ¶ 86826, at 87,142 (Jan. 31, 2003), 
68 Fed. Reg. 6564-85 (requiring disclosure); Murphy, supra note 108, at 546; see 
Aaron Lucchetti, Monthly Mutual Funds Review – Labor Puts Pressure on Funds – AFL-
CIO’s Trumka Discusses Why Unions Push for More Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2003, at 
R1 (discussing union support for disclosure of union votes); Jacoby, supra note 226, 
at 55; Taub, supra note 255, at 864 (describing conflicts of interest at Deutsche Bank 
resulting from its investment bank advising a takeover), and 868–69 (discussing 
Fidelity’s vote at Intel in light of it managing Intel’s 401(k) plan).  
 261  Strine, supra note 256, at 687. 
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activism on the firm level are captured by other shareholders.262  
Second, mutual funds also tend to focus on short-term investments, 
which is typically not compatible with shareholder activism.263  
Nevertheless, at least some mutual funds have become more active in 
recent years, pushing for shareholder wealth alongside other 
institutional investors.264  Mutual funds have also generally supported 
proposals, such as proxy access, to strengthen the role of 
shareholders in corporate governance.265 
The purpose of this Article is not to comprehensively explain 
shareholder activism and proxy voting by institutional investors that 
seek to bring managers more in line with shareholder concerns.  
Overall, there are considerable limitations to shareholder activism by 
any type of institutional investor, such as diversification and the lack 
of staff to take a deeply engaged role in systematic corporate 
governance research.266  The enthusiasm about institutional investor 
activism expressed by shareholder primacists certainly faded in the 
late 1990s and 2000s.267  In recent years, other factors have pushed 
firms more strongly to cater to the interests of shareholders, 
including the influence of proxy advisors, particularly Institutional 
Shareholder Services, on the voting decisions of financial 
institutions,268 activism by hedge funds taking larger stakes in firms.269 
The growth of the pension sector played a role for the development 
of the latter as well, since a sizeable proportion of hedge fund capital 
is today provided by pension funds.270 
 
 262  Id. at 687. 
 263  Palmiter, supra note 255, at 1431. 
 264  Id. at 1435–40; Gross, supra note 257; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled 
CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1001 (2010); see Black, supra note 217, at 602 (describing 
Fidelity’s transient opposition to an antitakeover statute in 1990); Gretchen 
Morgenson, Belated Apologies in Proxy Land, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/20/business/yourmoney/20gret.html 
(describing Putnam Funds attempt to influence firms); see also Iman Anabtawi & 
Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1276 (2008) 
(discussing mutual fund activism by Fidelity and Vanguard). 
 265  E.g., Letter from Barbara Krumsiek of Calvert Group Ltd. to Securities and 
Exchange Commission (July 23, 2007) available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
537/4537-79.pdf (supporting SEC proposal on proxy access). 
 266  E.g., Coffee, supra note 33, at 1975 (pointing out the limitations of even 
CalPERS’ possibilities).  
 267  Id. at 1981–83 (discussing possible reasons). 
 268  James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and 
Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 269  Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007).  
 270  THECITYUK, HEDGE FUNDS 2013, at 4, chart 10, available at 
http://www.thecityuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/hedge-funds-2012 
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The point of this section and the preceding ones is not been to 
suggest that the shift from DB to DC plans has encouraged 
shareholder activism; to the contrary, there might be less of it in the 
future as more workers are shifted into DC plans. The argument has 
been that labor-oriented institutions such as unions and pension 
funds have increasingly accepted the objective of shareholder wealth 
maximization as important for their constituencies. It may well be 
that shareholder activism is a relatively insignificant for managers; 
mutual funds’ practice of selling shares of firms with whose 
performance they are dissatisfied may well be considerably more 
important for creating pressure on firms to maintain a high share 
price (and possibly to focus on short-term gains). Mutual fund 
managers have good reasons to care about the performance of the 
stock in their portfolio, but not about how firms treat their 
employees; this holds true even if they manage the same employees’ 
pension wealth, since fund managers are institutionally completely 
separated from workers. While pension savings and the increase in 
the institutional character of share ownership have certainly 
encouraged shareholder activism and the implementation of reforms 
in line with the shareholder primacy vision, actual pressures to 
maximize share price might well increase as DB investment continues 
to be replaced by DC investment. 
VI. PENSIONS AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY ABROAD 
A quick look at other developed economies, particularly 
continental European countries and Japan, confirms the thesis that 
the shift from DB to DC plans is linked to the move from managerial 
to shareholder capitalism in the United States.  Both in terms of their 
corporate governance and pension systems, these countries look 
more—but not entirely—like the United States did before the 
changes described in Parts II to V. 
With respect to corporate governance, it is often claimed that in 
countries outside the common law world, shareholders are not very 
well protected, share ownership is concentrated, and capital markets 
are comparatively small.271  More importantly for this Article, 
 
(showing pension funds as the source of 22% of hedge fund assets in 2012, up from 
15% in 2004). 
 271  The reasons are highly disputed.  Based on cross-sectional empirical studies, it 
is often argued that the civil law tradition is less amenable to investor protection than 
the common law.  Rafeal La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The 
Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LIT. 285 (2008).  According to the 
contrary view, left-wing politics inhibited the development of pro-shareholder 
institutions in Continental Europe.  Mark J. Roe, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern 
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continental Europe and Japan are usually thought to be 
characterized by models that give precedence to other constituencies 
over shareholders.272  Germany, alongside a number of other Central 
and Northern European countries, stands out by giving employees 
representation on the board of directors, and thus at least some 
influence on corporate matters.273  Japanese firms have long been 
known for strong pro-worker orientation, in particular a “lifetime 
employment” relationship with employees.274  In combination with 
strong cross-ownership structures within the so-called “keiretsu,”275 
Japanese firms can probably even be called labor-dominated.  But 
even in jurisdictions with little or no employee participation in 
boardroom decision-making such as France and Italy, the extensive 
powers of controlling shareholders are balanced by strong labor laws 
that are considerably more strongly weighed in favor of employees 
than in the United States.276 
While there are of course many differences among the various 
Continental European pension systems as well as between the 
European and Japanese systems, there are two comparative patterns.  
First, government-funded Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) pensions systems 
play a greater role for retirees, at least in Continental Europe, than 
Social Security does in the United States.  While data from different 
countries are often directly comparable, the OECD figures on the 
sources of retirement income of those over 65 are probably most 
 
Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460, 502–16 (2006). 
 272  E.g., Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosis of “Germany Inc.”: The Case of Executive 
Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497, 500–01 (2001); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 
443–49; Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and 
Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 733 (2004); Klaus J. Hopt, Labor Representation 
on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate Governance and Economic 
Integration in Europe, 14 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 208–09 (1994). 
 273  See, e.g., Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance 
Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 168 (Margaret M. Blair & 
Mark J. Roe eds., 1999); Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The 
Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in 
THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 89, 100–01 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2009). 
 274  E.g., Caslav Pejovic, Japanese Corporate Governance: Behind Legal Norms, 29 PENN. 
ST. INT’L L. REV. 483, 492–95 (2011). 
 275  A keiretsu is a set of companies characterized by a common main bank, 
interlocking directorships and cross-ownership between the firms belonging to it.  
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J, Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps 
Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 872–73, 
882–84 (1993). 
 276  See, e.g., Gelter, supra note 47, at 171–73 (discussing employment law in 
Continental Europe). 
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illustrative.277 
 
Table 3. Sources of income for those 65 and older 
 Public transfers Work Capital 
France 85.44% 6.50% 8.07% 
Germany 73.07% 12.09% 14.84% 
Italy 72.20% 23.80% 4.00% 
Japan 48.34% 44.29% 7.37% 
United Kingdom 49.36% 12.09% 38.55% 
United States 36.13% 34.20% 29.67% 
  
 In the Continental European jurisdictions, public transfers (i.e. 
public pensions) dominate.  The United Kingdom resembles the 
United States more closely, except that less income is derived from 
work above sixty-five.  Japan similarly stands out because of its high 
percentage of income derived from work, which is likely due to the 
generous company pensions provided by large Japanese firms.  
Nevertheless, the low significance of income based on capital is 
striking.  Only looking at the ratio between public transfer and 
capital in each country would show that the relative importance of 
public and private pensions is similar to Continental Europe. 
Like Social Security, PAYGO systems abroad take the form of a 
DB plan underwritten by the government: employees and employers 
pay contributions to a government entity, which uses these funds to 
pay current retirees.  The amount of the pension normally depends 
on the number of years worked, contributions made, and the age of 
retirement.278 
 
 277  OECD, PENSIONS AT A GLANCE 60 (2009).  The data (for a larger set of 
countries) are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/635426478286.  Similar data 
for a small set of countries are also available for 1978–1980 at OECD, REFORMING 
PUBLIC PENSIONS, OECD SOCIAL POLICY STUDIES NO. 5, 55 (1988). 
 278  Lothar Schruff, Pensions and Post-Retirement Benefits by Employers in Germany, 64 
BROOK. L. REV. 795, 795 (1998); Bert Rürup, The German Pension System: Status Quo and 
Reform Options, in SOCIAL SECURITY PENSION REFORM IN EUROPE 137, 139–43 (Martin 
Feldstein & Horst Siebert eds., 2002); Kathryn L. Moore, Lessons from the French 
Funding Debate, 65 OHIO ST. L. J. 5, 9, 13 (2004) (describing the DB formula for 
French public pensions); Charles Yuji Horioka, Japan’s Public Pension System in the 
Twenty-First Century, in JAPAN’S NEW ECONOMY 99, 99–101 (Magnus Blomström, Byron 
Gangnes & Sumner La Croix eds., 2001) (Japan); see also Friedrich K. Kübler, 
Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A German Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 97, 
100 (1991) (reporting that in 1991, a German pension of a typical retiree 
corresponded to 70% of the last salary). 
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Second, private pensions in Continental Europe and Japan tend 
to be of the DB variety more often than in the United States or the 
United Kingdom,279 with domestic pension funds long remaining 
limited in significance.280  Both German and Japanese company 
pensions are traditionally “book reserve” plans, in which the firm 
commits to paying a specified pension in the future without setting 
up a trust fund.281  In 1996, about 56% of German employment-
related pension claims took this form.282  In France, employers’ 
organizations and labor unions jointly set up a national DB pension 
plan in the years after World War II.283 
The United Kingdom is an exception to the European pattern.  
Its corporate governance system has long been characterized by 
shareholder-centrism and differed both from the managerialism in 
the United States and the labor models of Continental Europe and 
Japan.284  Like the U.S. pension system, the U.K. system is 
characterized by a low level of state pensions and a high level of 
private pensions.285  As in the United States, pension reforms during 
 
 279  E.g., Gordon L. Clark, Pension Systems: A Comparative Perspective 7 (2000), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=228948.  
 280  E.g., Kübler, supra note 278, at 99 (“Pension funds so far have had very little 
importance.”). 
 281  Charny, supra note 57, at 1641; Stefan Prigge, A Survey of German Corporate 
Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE—THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING 
RESEARCH 943, 1019 (Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch & 
Stefan Prigge eds., 1998); MACKENZIE, supra note 139, at 227–28 (all discussing 
Germany); David Rajnes, The Evolution of Japanese Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plans, 
67 SOC. SEC. BUL. 89, 91, 93 (2007) (discussing Japan); Robert L. Clark, Japanese 
Pension Plans in Transition, BENEFITS Q., First Quarter 1996, at 59 (discussing DB 
payouts to retirees in Japan). 
 282  Schruff, supra note 278, at 804; see also Ahrend, supra note 281, at 86 
(providing the 1991 data). 
 283  Lucy apRoberts, Comments, in SECURING EMPLOYER-BASED PENSIONS 105, 109–10 
(Zvi Bodie, Olivia S. Mitchell & John A. Turner eds., 1996). 
 284  E.g., BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: BRITISH 
BUSINESS TRANSFORMED 30 (2008) (pointing out that in UK companies, shareholders 
can recall the board); Bruner, supra note 51, at 593–611; Dignam & Galanis, supra 
note 27, at 221–22 (both comparing the United Kingdom and the United States).  
The most known example is maybe the “City Code on Takeovers and Mergers,” 
which provides a self-regulatory framework for takeovers favoring shareholder 
choice.  
 285  The Basic State Pension is comparatively low for European standards and 
provides an average replacement ratio of only about 15%.  Carl Emmerson & Paul 
Johnson, Pension Provision in the United Kingdom, in PENSION SYSTEMS AND RETIREMENT 
INCOMES ACROSS OECD COUNTRIES 296, 299, 301 (Richard Disney & Paul Johnson 
eds., 2001); see also David Blake, The United Kingdom: Examining the Switch from Low 
Public Pensions to High-Cost Private Pensions, in SOCIAL SECURITY PENSION REFORM IN 
EUROPE, supra note 278, at 317, 317 (noting that public finances are thus less affected 
by demographic change).  The “State Second Pension” (S2P), which replaced a 
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the early 1980s encouraged British firms to shift from traditional DB 
plans to DC plans.286  Since the mid-1990s, the vast majority of new 
employer-sponsored plans have been DC plans, and more than half 
of existing DB plans have been phased out.287 
This brief comparison reveals a pattern: countries where workers 
rely more strongly on government pensions and DB plans than those 
in the United States also exhibit less developed pro-shareholder 
institutions in their corporate laws.  In the case of a stock market 
downturn, the modern American worker is immediately affected by 
the loss of value of his or her retirement account.  With stock markets 
much smaller relative to GDP288 and individual household savings 
more often held in savings accounts, movements in the stock market 
typically do not matter very much for the middle class in these 
countries.289  From the perspective of the Continental European or 
Japanese middle-class, it is “rich folks on Wall Street” who lose money 
in a stock market downturn.  Retirement benefits primarily depend 
on the government’s ability and willingness to fund the public 
pension system and, in some cases, employers’ ability to pay pensions. 
Christopher Bruner has proposed that the United Kingdom 
became more shareholder-centric than the United States because the 
British welfare state provides more benefits, particularly health care, 
than those provided by large firms to their employees in the United 
States.290  In other words, U.S. workers are more dependent on their 
employers.  As this Article shows, the shift from DB to DC plans has 
considerably reduced one aspect of dependence not highlighted by 
Bruner.  While Bruner’s explanation is complementary to this one, 
the effects of the change in the pension system are likely even more 
consequential, since they turned workers into shareholders. 
While it would be beyond the scope of this Article to fully 
explore the complex relationships among pension systems, corporate 
ownership structures, and possible international convergence toward 
 
similar plan known as SERPS in 2002, allows an opt-out into a private plan.  
Emmerson & Johnson, supra note 285, at 303. 
 286  Munnell, supra note 60, at 371–74; MACKENZIE, supra note 139, at 245–46 (all 
discussing changes in the British private pension system). 
 287  Munnell, supra note 60, at 375. 
 288  See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. 
Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1131 (1997).  
 289  Marcel Tyrell & Reinhard H. Schmidt, Pension Systems and Financial Systems in 
Europe: A Comparison from the Point of View of Complementarity, 47 IFO-STUDIEN 469, 488–
89 (2001) (suggesting that German firms with “book reserve” pensions rely less on 
capital markets compared to their UK equivalents). 
 290  Bruner, supra note 51, at 579. 
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shareholder primacy, some authors have identified demographic 
problems of public PAYGO pension systems both in Europe and 
Japan and an increasing international trend toward DC pension plans 
as a driver for this form of international convergence in corporate 
governance.291  In Continental Europe and Japan, a connection with 
the political movement to push national pension systems into the 
direction of the DC paradigm since the early 1990s seems very likely.  
Conspicuously, scholars identified some degree of convergence in 
corporate governance and a trend toward the shareholder model 
during the same period.292 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article argues that the place of shareholder primacy in the 
corporate governance system of the United States has shifted, at least 
partly due to the change from DB plans to DC plans.  When DC plans 
predominate, the advantages of shareholder primacy over a more 
expansive view of the objective of corporate law weigh more strongly 
than they did in the heyday of managerial capitalism.  The 
implication is that policies that give more weight to shareholders over 
labor have become relatively more desirable.  The shift from DB to 
DC plans made Americans more directly dependent on capital 
markets and thus helped to make shareholder primacy and 
shareholder wealth maximization more attractive intellectual 
positions. 
The impact on the actual politics of corporate governance is 
more ambiguous.  While a clear causal link is difficult to establish, it 
is clear that causation, at least in part, runs from the pension system 
to corporate governance.  Regulatory changes that pushed the 
pension system to where it is today, most of all ERISA, were intended 
to protect workers and not the consequence of changes in the 
financial system.  Thus, these changes in pension law were an 
exogenous factor that indirectly and unintentionally helped to 
transform corporate governance.  The greater dependence of 
workers’ pension wealth on the capital market instead of the 
employer possibly resulted in a reduction of firm-specific human 
capital, and thus strengthened political support for shareholder 
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primacy.  Many shareholder primacists would probably agree that 
pro-shareholder reforms often remain cosmetic.  Nevertheless, 
unions, which were once opponents of both management and 
shareholders in securing better conditions for workers, were co-opted 
into shareholder capitalism through the pension system.  The seeds 
for the development may have been sowed through the Taft-Hartley 
Act’s system of pension plans, run jointly by employers and unions, 
but it came to full fruition only when shareholder value started to 
become of profound importance to unions and their aging 
constituents.  Shareholder activism partly originated from institutions 
largely operating within the DB paradigm, such as union and public 
pension funds, which were also driven to increase equity investment 
by regulatory changes from the early 1980s onwards.  As far as private 
pension funds are concerned, ERISA’s fiduciary and funding 
requirements—which also helped to drive investment into DC 
plans—contributed to the spread of shareholder activism.  With 
union pension power declining because of the shift to 401(k) plans, 
unions are aware that they need to seek alliances with the managers 
of these plans to maintain their activist agenda.293 
History is said to repeat.  The end of the economic crisis that 
began in 2008 is still not in sight, and the popular press frequently 
draws comparisons to the Great Depression of the 1930s.  When the 
Great Depression devastated private investment in the stock markets 
and pension savings, the political response was the introduction of 
Social Security.294  Today, the reaction seems to be the opposite.  
During the past three decades, the ubiquitous 401(k) plan has 
become the default expectation for retirement benefits in the United 
States.  A growing number of Americans have become aware of 
corporate governance issues and how they affect their retirement 
prospects.  DC plans are even considered appropriate for public 
employees,295 and the Bush administration proposed to convert Social 
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Security into a contribution-based system with individual accounts.296 
Thus, in spite of criticism, it seems that the shareholder 
movement will continue and even gain more strength.  With 
employees often having the choice between different mutual fund 
families, IRAs, and other investment vehicles for their pension 
contributions, pressure on institutional investors to exert their 
corporate governance role more actively is bound to increase.  
Detractors of shareholder primacy often oppose pro-shareholder 
reforms on the level of corporations, and sometimes promote reform 
proposals that oppose the shareholder-oriented model.  This type of 
discussion tends to emphasize the corporate governance of firms, the 
demand side of the capital market.  This Article shows that changes 
in the pension system unleashed powerful forces on the supply side 
of the capital market that keep pushing corporate governance ever 
more strongly toward shareholder primacy.  Skeptics of shareholder 
primacy must rethink their agenda and address U.S. dependence on 
equity investment.  Otherwise, attempts to challenge the dominant 
model will be futile.  Shareholder primacy, with its positive and 
negative implications, will be here to stay. 
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